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I. INTRODUCTION: CONTENT-BASED LAWS THAT PROMOTE
FAVORED CONTENT
Current free speech doctrine appears to rest on a mistake. Consider
two hypothetical laws affecting American speech. First, cable carriers like
Comcast and Time Warner offer video-on-demand TV service, through
which customers can watch thousands of TV shows and movies "on
demand," not on a predetermined schedule.' Suppose Congress determines
that video-on-demand services could inform the public about key issues
during an election campaign and passes a law requiring each local cable
carrier to post, on demand, a ten minute campaign video from each
candidate listed on the local ballot. Under current doctrine, this lawmeant to promote informed democratic decision making-would likely be
subject to the strictest constitutional scrutiny as "content-based" and be
struck down as unconstitutional.
Second, consider a network-neutrality requirement. Cable and phone
carriers offer high-speed Internet service to consumers,2 and traditionally

1. Annual Assessment of Competition in the Delivery of Video Programming, Twelfth
Annual Assessment, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503, para. 57 (2006).
2. By international standards, the "high-speeds" available in the United States remain
quite slow. See DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK II: THE TRUTH BEHIND
AMERICA'S DIGITAL DECLINE 4 (2006), availableat www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf.
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did not block, degrade, or slow down certain Web sites.3 That is, a user
could access everything on the Internet, from CNN.com to the most
obscure blog, without discrimination. In 2005 and 2006, phone and cable
executives declared they would exercise their "editorial" control over their
"pipes" and favor some Web sites while degrading or blocking others. In
2008, the FCC found that Comcast blocked online technologies, including
BitTorrent, that are used by software companies to compete with cable
television.5 Suppose Congress concludes that letting cable and phone
companies restrict access to online content would reduce the diversity of
sources and content available to Internet users, and therefore passes a
"network neutrality" law enabling users to access and share all content
online.6 Many of the phone and cable companies and their defenders,
including one leading constitutional scholar, argue that this law-which
would condemn actions like Comcast's that employed the same censorship
tools used in China 7-- would be unconstitutional for violating the free
speech rights of telecommunications companies. 8 Under current doctrine,
courts may agree.9
3. See, e.g.,

LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS

147-76 (2001); Timothy Wu,

Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141
(2003).
4. For
examples,
see
Blocking
Innovation,
Save
The
Internet,
http://www.savethelntemet.com/--threat#abuse (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
5. See Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp.
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC
08-183 (rel. Aug. 20, 2008). Professor Ammori was the lead attorney on this case and the
primary author of the filings against Comcast. See, e.g., Bob Fernandez, FCC Ruling on
Comcast Would Be Big Win for a Geek, PA. INQUIRER, July 31, 2008, at Al; Peter Svensson,
Consumer Groups Ask FCC to Fine Comcast: Report Showed Cable Company Hindered
Some
File
Sharing
by
Subscribers,
MSNBC.coM,
Nov.
1,
2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21579686/.
6. Net neutrality caused considerable controversy in 2006, both derailing an omnibus
communications bill sailing through Congress and holding up the merger of AT&T and
BellSouth. See, e.g., John Dunbar, "Net Neutrality" Would Be Democrats' Pet, WASH.
POST,
Oct.
23,
2006,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/23/AR2006102300505.html; Tim Wu, Bellweather: Ma Bell is
Back. Should You Be Afraid?, SLATE, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2156918;
Posting of tkarr to Save the Internet Blog, (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.savetheinternet.com/
blog/2006/12/08/congress-closes-telco-bill-dies-on-the-vine/.
7. See Peter Svensson, Consumer Groups Ask FCC to Fine Comcast, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 1, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21579686/; see also
Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling at 3-14, Broadband Industry Practices,
FCC
WC
Docket
No.
07-52
(rel.
Nov.
1, 2006),
available at
http://www.freepress.net/docs/fpet-al nn declaratoryruling.pdf.
8. Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe has made this argument. See, e.g.,
Frank Pasquale, Larry Tribe's Lochner?, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Aug. 28, 2007,
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/O8/larryslochner.html. For an argument
that network neutrality may be unconstitutional, see Randolph J. May, Op-Ed, Net
Neutrality Would Violate the First Amendment Rights ofISPs, NAT. L.J., Aug. 16, 2006, at
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How can the First Amendment be understood to invalidate, or even
seriously question, these laws that promote diverse political speech? Much
of the problem has to do with mistaken assumptions about the cornerstone
of free speech doctrine: content analysis.
Content analysis provides strict scrutiny for "content-based" laws
(like the video-on-demand law) and a balancing test for "content-neutral"
laws (like the network neutrality law). 10 Scholars, judges, and Justices
almost uniformly assume that laws meant to promote favored content, even
diverse or political content, are "content-based" and considered as
problematic as those meant to suppress disfavored content. In fact, the
Supreme Court has wrongly suggested that one of the "settled principles of
our First Amendment jurisprudence" is to apply strict scrutiny to laws
meant to promote an informed citizenry. 1 Scholars widely assume that this
"settled" principle is normatively desirable, as content-based laws are seen
12
as threats to freedom of speech.
23, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1155559192876 (conceding net
neutrality is content-neutral); Comments of Time Warner Cable, Inc., Broadband Industry
Practices, FCC WC Docket No. 07-52 (rel. Feb. 13, 2008); see also Moran Yemini,
Mandated Internet Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from Turner and a New
Approach,
14
VA.
J.L.
& TECH.
(forthcoming
2009),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-984271. I do not agree that the Turner test necessarily invalidates
network neutrality rules. See, e.g., Ex Parte Comments of Timothy Wu & Lawrence Lessig,
High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, FCC CS Docket No. 0252 (rel. Aug. 22, 2003) available at http://www.freepress.net/files/wu lessigfcc.pdf; Bill
D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED.
COMM. L.J. 103 (2007).
9. Cf Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994);
Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
10. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xi, 1049-1484 (2005)
(organizing freedom of expression subchapters based on content-analysis); LAURENCE
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-94 (categorizing the "two ways" government
might abridge speech as either content-neutral or content-based); Larry A. Alexander,
Trouble on Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 921 (1993); C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based
Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 57; John Fee, Speech
Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103 (2005); Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust:
Rethinking the Content Approach to Protectingthe Freedom ofExpression, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1347 (2006); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413 (1996); Martin
H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113,
123-25 (1981); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46
(1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 189 (1983); Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 81 (1978); Susan H.
Williams, Content Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615 (1991).
11. See Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622,639 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J.
1757 (1995) (discussing Turner's paradox); Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and
Beyond?-Tumer Broadcasting v. FCC, 15 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 27-35 (1997)
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The widely shared and deeply held assumptions about content
analysis are wrong. They neither reflect existing law nor conform to the
First Amendment's normative goals. Government need not be "neutral"
regarding speech, and can promote particular classes of content.
Government often favors content that is traditionally believed necessary for
an informed citizenry, such as viewpoint-diverse, political, local, and
educational content,1 3 which here I call "democratic content." Democratic
content is widely believed to deserve vigilant protection because of its role
in democratic decision making 4 and because politicians have incentives to
suppress such speech.' 5 According to most precedent, in fact, content-based
promotion is acceptable, subject to a mere viewpoint-neutrality
requirement.' 6 And such promotion should be acceptable, as it serves First
Amendment values of participatory democracy and individual liberty.
Although most precedent supports content-based promotion,17 such
promotion is questioned in two areas. The first is compelled individual
speech in certain circumstances. I address this issue at the end of this
Article. Generally, this exception makes sense, but for reasons other than
content neutrality, and therefore does not support a claim for content
neutrality.
The second exception is the focus of this Article, both because this
Article argues that we should abandon this particular exception (unlike the
other) and because the exception's domain significantly impacts how
(arguing that Turner I was content-based); see also Nancy J. Whitmore, The Evolution ofthe
Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the Rise of the Bottleneck "Rule" in the Turner
Decisions, 8 COMM. L. & POL'Y 25, n.199 (2003) (collecting articles claiming that Turner
was wrong because must-carry was content-based).
13. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 677, 688 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (taken together,
"[p]references for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and
for news and public affairs," aim to produce an "informed electorate"); Kagan, supra note
10, n. 145 (claiming a "prohibition on the government's" attempts "to improve the content of
the speech market"); see also Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 180,

222 (1997).
14. See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,

MANAGEMENT 272 (1998) ("[Tlhere is little dispute that one of the most important themes
of [First Amendment] doctrine is the Amendment's function 'as the guardian of our
democracy') (internal quotation omitted); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without
Romance. Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REv. 554, 562 (1991)
("Everyone seems to agree that political speech lies at the core of the First Amendment's
protection."); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002)
(quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelley, 247 F.3d 854, 861 (8th Cir. 2001))
(condemning a law burdening "a category of speech that is 'at the core of our First
Amendment freedoms'-speech about the qualifications of candidates for public office");
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 381 (1984) (stating "[T]he
expression of editorial opinions ...lies at the heart of First Amendment protection.").
15. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381,
16. See infra Part 11.
17. See infra Part II.
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Americans communicate with one another. This exception is for the
regulation of speech carried over telephone and cable wires,18 particularly
certain services, such as cable television (including video-on-demand) and
perhaps Internet service, though not wireline phone calls.' 9 Wireline media
may be the lone problematic exception in part because the Supreme Court
most explicitly conflated content-based suppression and promotion in dicta
in a landmark case involving a cable-access rule, Turner BroadcastingCo.
v. FCC, in 1994.20 Considering that Americans watch television for four
hours a day and get most of their news from cable, broadcast TV, and the
Internet,2 ' this exception has a profound impact on American speech.
Moreover, this "exception" could jeopardize the ambitious technology
agenda of President Barack Obama. During the 2008 campaign, thenSenator Obama issued an ambitious "innovation agenda" calling for
stringent media ownership rules, an unwavering commitment to network
neutrality, and high-speed Internet access for all.22 Indeed, increasingly,
Congress, the FCC, and the States have been debating content-promoting
communications policies,23 including ownership limits and access rules,
which consciously aim to promote access to private infrastructure for
particular content-generally, diverse, educational, and political content

18. For a discussion of different platforms offering TV service and their respective
usages, see Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Twelfth Annual Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 2503 (2006). For those offering
voice service, see Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with
Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Eleventh Report, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947 (2006);
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE
(Feb. 2007), availableat 2007 WL 439063.
19. Generally, scholars argue that all platforms should be treated with very strict
protections for their owners, supposedly unlike broadcast. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The
Rise andDemise of the Technologically-SpecificApproach to the FirstAmendment, 91 GEO.
L.J. 245 (2003); Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Williams,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
20. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 180 (1997); see also
Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turnerl), 512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994).
21. See, e.g., Comments of United Church of Christ et al. at 41-42 2006 Quadrennial
Review, FCC MB Docket No. 06-121 (rel. Oct. 23, 2006) (and sources cited therein)
[hereinafter United Church of Christ Comments].
22. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, BARACK OBAMA: CONNECTING AND EMPOWERING ALL
AMERICANS
THROUGH
TECHNOLOGY
AND
INNOVATION
(2007), available at
http://obama.3cdn.net/780e0e91 ccb6cdbf6e_6udymvin7.pdf.
23. In 2006, the House passed, and the Senate Commerce Committee reported, an
omnibus communications act. See David Hatch, Stevens Concedes "Net Neutrality" May
Kill Telecom Bill This Year, TECHNOLOGY DAILY, Sept. 12, 2006, available at
http://saveaccess.org/node/458. Several states, including California, Texas, and Michigan,
have adopted major communications legislation. See, e.g., Implementation of Section
621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 as Amended by the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Report and Order and
FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101 (2007).
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necessary for an informed citizenry.2 4 But, lower courts have wrongly used
heightened scrutiny through content-analysis to invalidate wireline
regulation meant to promote democratic content. These cases invalidate
speech-enhancing legislative attempts and discourage other legislatures
from passing similar laws.25
Take, for example, network neutrality, which is highly contentious, 26
at the top of President Obama's campaign promises regarding technology,
and far more practically important than academics' darling topics like flag
burning or hate speech.27 Every major consumer group has endorsed
network neutrality; 28 Moveon.org and the Christian Coalition of America
are in the same pro-network-neutrality coalition;29 the Senate and House
committees on commerce and on the judiciary have held hearings on
network neutrality; 30 every Democratic presidential candidate in 2008, as
well as Republican Mike Huckabee, endorsed network neutrality; 31
thousands of press and legal articles have discussed network neutrality;3 2 at
24. The same is true, I would argue, of universal service rules, which aim to promote
communications and information capabilities to all Americans. See Century Fed., Inc. v.
City of Palo Alto, 710 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1987); PETER HUBER, MICHAEL K.
KELLOGG, & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 1316 (2nd Ed. 1999)
(presenting telephone build-out as a "speech" problem because it "requires connecting up to
listeners and/or speakers that the provider would rather avoid").
25. See infra Part III.
26. John M. Peha, William H. Lehr & Simon Wilkie et al., The State of the Debate on
Network Neutrality, 1 INT. J. COMM. 709, 709 (2007) ("The debate over 'network neutrality'
has recently emerged as the single most important communications policy issue-at least
within the United States-that is now being debated around the world."); Charles
Babington, Neutrality On the Net Gets High '08 Profile, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2007, at D1,
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/19/AR
available
2007021900934.html.
27. See generally Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech
Curriculum Ignores Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 Mo. L. REV.
59 (2005).
28. See Save the Internet: Join Us, http://savethelnternet.com/=coalition (last visited
Jan. 30, 2009).
29. Savethelnternet.com, Moveon.org & The Christian Coalition, When it Comes to
Protecting Internet Freedom, the Christian Coalition and MoveOn Respectfully Agree
(2006) (advertisement), available at http://cdn.moveon.org/contentlpdfs/MoveOnChristian
Coalition.pdf.
30. See, e.g., ANGELE A. GILROY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NET
available
at
NEUTRALITY:
BACKGROUND
AND
ISSUES
(2007),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22444.pdf; Anne Broache, Politicos Make New Pushfor
Net Neutrality Policing, CNET.COM, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_39891217-7.html?tag=nefd.top.
31. Anne Broache, Obama Pledges Net Neutrality Laws if Elected President,
CNET.COM, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.news.com/8301-10784_3-9806707-7.html (noting
also Gov. Huckabee's support).
32. See, e.g., ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PHILIP J. WEISER, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION
FOUrND., A "THIRD WAY" ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY (2006), available at http:l
www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf; Peter Burrows & Olga Kharif, The FCC, Comcast, and
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least four major bills have been introduced to codify network neutrality;33
800 rock bands have endorsed network neutrality, including OK Go, whose
singer testified before Congress; 34 millions of Americans have shared and
downloaded YouTube videos supporting network neutrality, as well as
signed petitions to Congress.35
Without network neutrality, unions could be blocked when trying to
organize (which happened in Canada 36); YouTube and its competitors
would not provide a platform for political videos and parodies, 37 but would
be squeezed to pay "taxes" to phone and cable companies (as phone
executives have publicly wished38 ); and the Participatory Culture
Foundation would not be able to offer its 3,500 channels of political and
Net
Neutrality, Bus.
WEEK
ONLINE,
Feb.
26,
2008,
available at
http://www.businessweek.com/print/technology/content/feb2008/tc20080225_498413.htm;
Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the Economics of an
Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JtJRIMETRICS J. 383 (2007),
available at http:/ ssm.com/abstract=- 1014691; Herman, supra note 8; Lawrence Lessig, In
Support of Network Neutrality, 3 J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 185 (2007); Lawrence
Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, Op-Ed, No Tolls on the Internet, WASH. POST, June 8,
2006, at A23, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
06/07/AR2006060702108.html; Howard A. Shelanski, Network Neutrality: Regulating With
More Questions Than Answers, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2007); Tim Wu,
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141
(2003); Yemini, supra note 8; Christopher Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1 (2005).
33. Anne Broache, Net Neutrality Field in Congress Gets Crowded, CNET.COM, May
19,
2006,
http://www.news.com/Net-neutrality-field-in-Congress-gets-crowded/2 1001028 3-6074564.html.
34. Timothy Karr, OK Go to Congress: OK Act, HUFFINGTON POST, March 13, 2008,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/timothy-karr/ok-go-to-congress-ok-act b_ 91337.html.
35. Posting of tkarr to Save the Internet Blog, (Dec. 8, 2006),
http://www.savetheintemet.con/blog/2006/12/08/congress-closes-telco-bill-dies-on-thevine/.
36. See, e.g., The Telus Blockade and the Law, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/
content/view/914/125/ (July 26, 2005).
37. See, e.g., Gil Kaufman, Will.l.Am's "Yes We Can" Obama Video Spawns John
McCain "No You Can't" Spoofs, MTV.coM, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.mtv.com/news/
articles/i 581403/20080212/will_iam.jhtml.
38. See Spencer E. Ante & Roger 0. Crockett, Rewired and Ready for Combat,
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 7, 2005, at 110, available at http://www.businessweek.coml/
magazine/content/05_45/b3958089.htm (quoting the AT&T CEO Edward E. Whitacre Jr.
saying that software and online companies "don't have any fiber out there. They don't have
any wires. They don't have anything .... They use my lines for free-and that's bull. For a
Google or a Yahoo! or a Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes for free is nuts!");
Arshad Mohammed, Verizon 's Executive Callsfor End to Google's "FreeLunch, " WASH.
POST, Feb 7, 2006, at Dl, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/06/AR2006020601624.html (quoting Verizon Senior Vice
President and Deputy General Counsel, John Thorne, as stating "The network builders are
spending a fortune constructing and maintaining the networks that Google intends to ride on
with nothing but cheap servers ....
It is enjoying a free lunch that should, by any rational
account, be the lunch of the facilities providers.").
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entertainment television for free online (which is why that organization
filed with the FCC regarding Comcast's secret blocking of technologies
used by Miro39 ).
In response to the enormous public support for network neutrality, the
phone and cable companies invested over $100 million in lobbying
Congress and the FCC. 40 Should they fail with Congress and the FCCwhich appears likely with Barack Obama's election-they will press First
Amendment claims in the courts. Their frequent (and, of course,
exceptional) First Amendment lawyer, Harvard Law School Professor
Laurence Tribe, has already asserted that network neutrality laws would
violate the First Amendment. 4 1 He does so largely on the shaky foundation
of content analysis.
To properly unpack the content distinction, and therefore to make
First Amendment analysis relevant for the twenty-first century, we must
face the issue of mass media and Internet regulation and its impact on free
speech doctrine.4 2
Constitutional debate over media regulation usually focuses not on
content analysis, but on other arguments, such as an individual's right to be
heard,43 the fostering of collective democratic discourse," the benefits of an
unconcentrated media system,45 and free speech and culture.46 On the other
39. See Reply Comments of Free Press, et al., Broadband Industry Practices, FCC WC
Docket No. 07-52, (rel. Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://www.freepress.net/docs/
freepress comcastjpetition replycomments.pdf.
40. Ted Hearn, Mad Money: Cable, Phone, Net Companies Have Spent $110 Million
This Year To Influence Telecom Reform. Was It Worth It?, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 23,
2006, at 14, availableat http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA6383576.htm.
41. See, e.g., Pasquale, supra note 8; see also infra note 46.
42. See Kagan, supra note 10, at 464-72 (discussing media cases briefly only to endorse
Miami Herald over Red Lion and the Turner dissents over the Turner majorities); Stone,
Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 10, at 98; see also Ammori, Curriculum, supra
note 27.
43. Jerome A. Barron, On Understandingthe FirstAmendment Status of Cable: Some
Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1495 (1989).
44. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993); Thomas I. Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv.
795 (1981); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1987); Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1405 (1986).
45. C. Edwin Baker has argued that courts should distinguish between rules structuring
media and those regulating content. See Baker, Turner, supra note 10. Yochai Benkler has
eloquently defended the benefits of a decentralized information environment. YOCHAI
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 261-65 (2006); see also Ammori, Curriculum, supra
note 27, at 73-80; Michael J. Burstein, Note, Towards a New Standardfor FirstAmendment
Review of StructuralMedia Regulation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1030 (2004). Arguments for or
against decentralization are partly tied to content. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air
to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv., 354, 377-82 (1999); cf Neil W. Netanel, The Commercial Mass Media's
Continuing Fourth Estate Role, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION (Niva Elkin-
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side, arguments include media companies' right to be free from compelled
speech, 47 problems with the underlying rationales in certain cases, 48 and
analogies and distinctions among different media.49 While these other
frameworks may be useful,50 courts and scholars generally apply content
analysis5 '-the appropriate analysis should distinguish between
suppression and promotion.
Koren & Neil W. Netanel, eds., 2002); Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and
the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (2005).
46. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of
Freedom ofExpression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2004).
47. See, e.g., William E. Lee, Cable Modem Service and the First Amendment:
Adventures in a "Doctrinal Wasteland," 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 125 (2002); Martin H.
Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory:
Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 1083 (1999); James
A. Bello, Comment, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC: The Supreme Court
Positions Cable Television on the First Amendment Spectrum, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 695,
735 (1996) (relying on Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974))
("Irrespective of whether the regulations are deemed content based, strict scrutiny should be
applied because the must-carry provisions interfere with the editorial discretion of cable
operators."); see also Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies,
and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1373
(2007) (discussing and responding to opponents of access rights); cf Denver Area Educ.
Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 817 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (characterizing public access channels as "forc[ing] an unwilling
operator to speak"). For arguments on Internet delivery, see Barron, Understanding the First
Amendment Status of Cable, supra note 43; Ex Parte Submission of Timothy Wu &
Lawrence Lessig, High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and & Other Facilities,
FCC CS Docket. No. 02-52 (rel. Aug. 22, 2003).
48. See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Mdobius Strip of the First Amendment:
Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539 (1978) (and sources cited therein); Jonathan
Weinberg, Broadcasting and Speech, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1103, n.145 (1993) (collecting
sources attacking the "scarcity" rationale).
49. Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1062, 1062 (1994) ("Courts often succumb to the
temptation to analogize new electronic technologies media to existing technologies for
which they have already developed First Amendment models.").
50. See Marvin Ammori, The First Amendment's Structure (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
51. Authors analyzing Turner I generally argued the rules should have been subject to
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Winer, supra note 12; Whitmore, supra note 12, at 48, n.199 (2003)
(collecting articles); Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REv. 139, 276 (1994). By contrast, an
article by C. Edwin Baker and two short articles co-authored by Monroe Price and Donald
Hawthorne suggested that courts should endorse government attempts to promote particular
content for an informed citizenry. See Baker, Turner, supra note 10; Donald W. Hawthorne
& Monroe E. Price, Rewiring the First Amendment: Meaning, Content and Public
Broadcasting, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 499 (1994); Monroe E. Price & Donald W.
Hawthorne, Saving Public Television: The Remand of Turner Broadcasting and the Future
of Cable Regulation, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65 (1994). Baker argued that
corporate institutions, unlike individuals, should be subject to structural regulatory rules,
even if content-motivated, and demonstrated that government had in fact long engaged in
content-motivated structural regulation of the press. But his article focused on the
distinction between structure and content, and between corporate entities and real
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Scholarly debate over content analysis has overlooked the distinction
between content-based promotion and suppression. 52 This Article fills that
gap and advances what is, perhaps surprisingly, a revolutionary argument
in First Amendment literature. Simply stated: free speech doctrine does
and should explicitly distinguish between laws meant to promote favored
content (particularly the content necessary for an informed citizenry) and
those meant to suppress disfavored content. While scholars may proffer
objections to this principle-based on the role of government, institutional
competence concerns, private property rights, or the treatment of
newspapers-none is persuasive.
Part II of this Article presents the conventional wisdom on content
analysis and its role in press regulation, as well as the preferable framework
introduced here. Part III demonstrates that, as a matter of positive law,
considerable precedent reflects that content promotion is unproblematic, if
it is viewpoint-neutral. Part IV demonstrates that permitting democratic
content promotion conforms to the First Amendment's purposes. That part
also rejects the objections to permitting content promotion, particularly in
media regulation.

II. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON CONTENT
The conventional view of content analysis is that all laws based on
content should be subject to strict scrutiny.5 4 While subject to many
nuances, the conventional view can be stated briefly. "Viewpoint"
discrimination generally refers to laws discriminating against speakers
based on particular views, beliefs, or opinions, especially views associated
with one political party or on highly controversial matters of public

individuals, not content -promotion and -suppression. See Baker, Turner, supra note 10. In a
later paper on copyright, almost in passing and with little elaboration, Baker stated,

"[a]rguably the First Amendment is best understood to distinguish between content
suppression and content promotion, condemning only the former." C. Edwin Baker, First
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAN. L. REv. 891, 930-31 (2002). Price and Hawthorne
focused on the educational value of noncommercial television. See Hawthorne & Price,
Rewiring the FirstAmendment, supra. Neither of these articles contrasts Turner's analysis
with doctrinal areas beyond media, advances the broader positive and normative arguments
for accepting content-based promotion generally, or proposes any applicable test, such as a
viewpoint-neutrality test, or other administrable limit for content- promotion.
52. See supra notes 10 and 12.
53. See supra note 51 (discussing the only scholars who have, to my knowledge, hinted
at a similar argument).
54. See, e.g., Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 117 n.88; Frederick Schauer, The
Boundariesof the FirstAmendment: A PreliminaryExploration of ConstitutionalSalience,
117 HARv. L. REv. 1765 (2004) (discussing conventional "content" analysis's boundaries);
see also infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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importance.5 5 Courts routinely invalidate laws discriminating against
viewpoints with very few exceptions-applying a rule against viewpoint
discrimination even for speech with no First Amendment protection and
where content discrimination would be permissible.56
"Content" is broader than viewpoint, in that it also includes "subjectmatter. '' 57 For example, a law suppressing political (or, say indecent)
speech would be content-based but not viewpoint-based; 58 a law
suppressing Republican political (or indecent) speech would be viewpointbased. 9 A law promoting content would be one favoring political or
educational speech in general,6 ° while one favoring a viewpoint would
require a particular view, such as pledging allegiance to the flag.6'

55. Laws can raise the danger of viewpoint discrimination for one of two reasons. First,
they could penalize or favor certain viewpoints. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1),
512 U.S. 622, 660 (1994) (distinguishing must-carry from laws "structured in a manner that
raised suspicions that their objective was, in fact, the suppression of certain ideas"). Second,
they could grant government standardless discretion, with which government could
potentially manipulate and chill certain viewpoints. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (parades); City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co.,
486 U.S. 750, 769-70 (1988) (news racks); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S.
147, 150-51 (parades); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (leaflets and
meetings in streets and public places); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51
(1938) (leaflets); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Takes a Narrow View of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 35 TRIAL 90, 90 (Mar. 1999). One exception to this narrow definition is
religion. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 168
(1996).
56. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (viewpoint
neutrality for limited public forum); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(viewpoint neutrality for "fighting words," which lack constitutional protection). The most
well-known exception is government speech. See, e.g., Note, The Curious Relationship
Between the Compelled Speech and Government Speech Doctrines, 117 HARv. L. REV. 2411

(2004).
57. See, e.g., Heins, supra note 55, at 101 (noting courts often use the terms content and
viewpoint interchangeably).
58. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (involving suppression of indecent
content); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
59. See News Am. Publ'g Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (invalidating a
law requiring one particular conservative media owner to divest newspapers or TV stations).
60. See, e.g., Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 971-73 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(upholding grant of authority to local franchises to require cable carriage of public,
educational, and governmental channels); Policies and Rules Concerning Children's
Television Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660 (1996).
61. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (law requiring
utility company to include envelope inserts from organization opposing the company's
views); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (law requiring drivers to have license
plates of state message of "Live Free or Die"); W. Va. State Bd. Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943) (law requiring schoolchildren to pledge allegiance to the flag).
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Current doctrine on content analysis suggests that laws characterized
as "content-based" receive strict scrutiny and are struck down.62 This
doctrine is believed to further the First Amendment's underlying goals,
such as democracy and autonomy. 63 But to serve democracy and autonomy,
the content-based rule has numerous, varied exceptions, 64 which suggest
that content discrimination is meant to do something else-such as
discover political viewpoint discrimination.6 5 Despite the necessity of a
myriad of necessary coping exceptions,66 some analysts defend content
analysis as the least imperfect doctrinal alternative available.67
Under content-analysis, both content-based and content-neutral laws
receive a "heightened" scrutiny above rational basis, though content-based
laws receive more stringent scrutiny than content-neutral laws.

62. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 10, at 1365, n.63 (explaining that every law
classified as content-based by a Supreme Court majority has been struck down, and that
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992), and Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652 (1990), are not exceptions). Technically, strict scrutiny requires that government
prove both a compelling interest and narrow tailoring through using the least restrictive
means. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
63. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 10; Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 10, at
251 ("[T]he [content] distinction ... is consistent with core first amendment values.").
64. Government may suppress content including obscenity, fighting words, sexual
harassment, fraud, criminal conspiracy, deceptive advertising, collusive agreements,
blackmail, and passing military secrets to foreign enemies-all based on content. See, e.g.,
Schauer, supra note 54; see also James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:
Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1413 (1992). Laws
targeting "commercial" content are not for that reason deemed content-based. See, e.g.,
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
Laws suppressing indecent content are judged content-neutral if focused on "secondary
effects." See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (suggesting indecency can be regulated as to
children).
65. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 10 (arguing the exceptions mean to smoke out illicit
motive). Indeed, the Court often confusingly uses the terms "content" and "viewpoint"
interchangeably, characterizes content discrimination as aimed at "message," and has
suggested that the main problem with content discrimination is the threat of viewpoint
discrimination. See, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 641-43
(1994) (and cases cited therein); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315, (1990);
Heins, supra note 55.
66. See, e.g., Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 116 (criticizing the use under content
analysis of scrutiny levels without normative analysis for "deflect[ing] discussion from the
real issues"); McDonald, supra note 10 (cataloguing the "coping" mechanisms necessary in
content analysis); Redish, supra note 10, at 113 (arguing that the distinction is "theoretically
questionable and difficult to apply").
67. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting "regulations are occasionally struck down because of their content-based nature,
even though common sense may suggest that they are entirely reasonable," but claiming that
"no better alternative has yet come to light").
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III. DESCRIPTIVE ARGUMENT: CONTENT PROMOTION DOES NOT
RECEIVE HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY, AND MUST MERELY BE
VIEWPOINT-NEUTRAL
Precedent makes clear the usual rule-government can attempt to
promote favored democratic content, so long as government does not favor
or disfavor particular viewpoints.

A.

DoctrinalAreas Endorsing Viewpoint-Neutral Content

Promotion
Precedent supporting this rule includes limited public fora, subsidized
speech, copyright, and speech exceptions in general laws, and the
regulation of broadcasting and other major mass media.

1. Limited Public Fora, Subsidies, Copyright, and Other Speech
Exceptions
The free speech doctrine of four non-media areas reflects the
viewpoint-neutral test. First, generally, government can create a limited
public forum to promote particular subject matter and speakers-such as
for student speaking activities or public television debates-so long as
government does not discriminate among viewpoints.68 Such promotion is
not subject to strict scrutiny or to intermediate scrutiny, and such
promotion need not be narrowly tailored or minimally burdensome-in
69
contrast to other speech that the government does not promote.
Second, generally, government can subsidize, and thereby promote,
favored content. 70 For example, though government cannot impose special
taxes exclusively on newspapers (suppression); by contrast, it can generally
provide tax exemptions to subsidize newspapers (promotion). 71 Also,
without strict or intermediate scrutiny, it can subsidize some nonprofit
68. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000);
Ark. Educ. TV Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
69. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46
(1983); see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 214 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
("Instead, I believe that [the challenged law], though content-based, is constitutional
because it is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum.").
70. See, e.g., Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of
Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media, 1 J.TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 217 (2002)
(trying to make sense of subsidized speech doctrine); Charles W. Logan, Jr., Getting Beyond
Scarcity: A New Paradigmfor Assessing the Constitutionalityof Broadcast Regulation, 85
CAL. L. REv. 1687 (1997); Martin H. Redish & Daryl L. Kessler, Government Subsidies and
Free Expression, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543 (1996).
71. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (in dicta, noting that newspapers were
excepted from a general sales tax); cf Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (upholding exception to campaign finance laws for media companies' speech).
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speech while not subsidizing for-profit or lobbying speech;72 it can fund
some art and not other art; 73 it can fund some educational institutions and
not others.74
Third, copyright law enables the government to promote content
75
supporting what Neil Netanel has called a "democratic civil society.
Government provides property-like benefits to foster "original" content,
thereby promoting diverse content. 76 It also provides content-based benefits
through fair use, which permits a defense against copyright infringement
specifically for "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research. .. .
Copyright law also provides several content-based exemptions for schools
and libraries, 78 as well as compulsory licenses, such as one for
noncommercial broadcasting.79
Fourth, with the most minimal scrutiny, government can impose
speech-based exceptions to general laws in order to promote certain
content.80 For example, bans against importing materials from enemy
countries may constitutionally exempt certain publications in order to
promote access to that content. 81 Laws banning commercial sales can
exempt newspapers without exempting all other content.8 2 Courts have
generally not subjected these laws to strict or intermediate scrutiny unless
the exceptions appeared targeted at viewpoints.8 3
Similarly, government can promote commercial speech, subject to far
less scrutiny than when restricting such speech. Burdens on commercial

72. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983);
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
73. See Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
74. See Fee, supra note 10, at 1138-39, and sources cited therein (discussing public
schools); cf Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
75. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283 (1996).
76. See, e.g., id.; see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the FirstAmendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright Extension,
16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 289 (2003).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). See also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use
Doctrine Harms FreeSpeech andHow Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L. J. 535, 544 (2004).
78. §§ 108, 110.
79. § 118. For additional exceptions, see Tushnet, supra note 77, at 553; see also
Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278 (2004)
(discussing commercial exceptions).
80. See, e.g., Note, Speech Exceptions, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1729-30 (2005).
81. See Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (addressing posters).
82. See Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
the contention that the law's exception for newspapers made it content-based or invalid).
83. See, e.g., id. at 1036; cf Walsh, 927 F.2d at 1238-39 (Williams, J., concurring).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 61

84
speech must meet an intermediate-but increasingly demanding scrutiny set forth in CentralHudson v. Public Service Commission of New
York. s5 But the Supreme Court has been explicit that this test is usually met
easily when government is promoting, not suppressing, commercial speech,
such as by compelling commercial disclosures.8 6

2. Broadcast Media Regulation: Making Sense of Radio,
Television, and Satellite Doctrine
For decades, scholars have debated the logic of the free speech
doctrine applied to broadcast media, arguing that the doctrine made no
sense.8 7 But the best framework for understanding that doctrine is to
distinguish between laws promoting democratic content and those
suppressing content. For example, the usual explanations for broadcast
doctrine ("scarcity" of spectrum licenses and "pervasiveness" of
broadcasting) merely suggest why broadcasting could get minimal scrutiny.
But neither one can explain why any broadcast law gets struck down,
though broadcast laws do get struck down.
Content promotion is a better framework. Broadcast regulation
generally permits government to promote certain favored, democratic
content with little scrutiny, while applying far more stringent scrutiny to
attempts to suppress disfavored speech or to engage in viewpoint
discrimination. For example, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC8 involved
two affirmative requirements: an individual right of reply and a
requirement that broadcasters provide news in a balanced way. The Court
concluded both were content-promoting,8 9 and used the language of

84. See Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech
and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2836 (2005).
85. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
86. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
("[A]ppellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing any particular factual
information in his advertising is minimal.... [W]e have emphasized that because disclosure
requirements trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat
prohibitions on speech ....").Recent cases involving advertising funds seem to take
compelled commercial-speech claims seriously, but their impact is limited, as the last case
in the line made clear that compelling contributions to the funds is constitutional. See, e.g.,
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); see also Robert Post, Transparent
and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial
Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 555, 558 (2006)
(arguing that compelled subsidies for commercial speech had been deemed unproblematic in
every Supreme Court case other than United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405
(2001), which struck down an advertising fund).
87. See, e.g., Ammori, Curriculum, supra note 27.
88. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
89. Id. at 393 (characterizing the fairness doctrine as speech-promoting, stating, "[a]nd
if experience with the administration of those doctrines indicates that they have the net
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minimal-not intermediate-scrutiny to uphold the requirements.9" In a
1978

case, FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting

(NCCB),91 again with minimal scrutiny, the Court upheld a limit on
newspapers owning broadcast stations, concluding that the limit was a
reasonable means to promote diverse content through diverse ownership. 92
With minimal scrutiny, television and radio broadcasters have been subject
to many other national and local, vertical and horizontal ownership limits
meant to promote diverse and local political content. 93 In 1981, in CBS v.
FCC,94 the Court upheld the requirement that broadcasters grant access to
candidates for federal elective office because the rule promoted "the ability
of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary
for the effective operation of the democratic process. 9 5 In 1996, applying
Red Lion, the D.C. Circuit upheld the requirement that satellite TV
companies carry noncommercial educational broadcasters, as "a reasonable
means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass
communications., 96 That same year, TV broadcasters did not even
challenge rules that effectively required them to air children's educational
programming, perhaps because minimal scrutiny would have applied to
97
such content-based promotion.
By contrast, the Court applied a higher standard where the
suppression of political speech was involved. In FCC v. League of Women
Voters,98 scarcity or no scarcity, the Court invalidated a government ban on
editorializing by government-funded public stations, even using the
language of intermediate-not minimal-scrutiny to strike down the ban.99

effect of reducing rather than enhancing the volume and quality of coverage, there will be
time enough to reconsider the constitutional implications").
90. Id.at 379 (merely requiring the FCC to act reasonably); see also Turner Brdcst.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 637 (citing Red Lion as an example of less
rigorous, not intermediate, scrutiny).
91. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
92. Id. at 797.
93. See, e.g., Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004) (including
the history of national and local horizontal rules); Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d
1043 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing the history of certain vertical rules).
94. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
95. Id. at 370.
96. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting FCC
v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 802 (1978)).
97. See The Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a-303b; Children's
Television Programming, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 10660 (1996); cf Time Warner
Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (1996) (applying RedLion).
98. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
99. Id. at 380 (stating the test as whether the law is "narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest") (relying on, wrongly it seems, RedLion, among others).
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Similarly, different rationales generally apply to content-based
promotion and content-based suppression. In FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,'0' a case involving the suppression of indecency on radio, the
Supreme Court specifically refused to apply the scarcity rationale'0 2
because "scarcity has justified increasing the diversity of speakers and
speech, [but] it has never been held to justify censorship."'0 3 Unlike Red
Lion and NCCB, which were unanimous and sweeping, Pacifica was a five
to four decision characterized by the majority as emphatically narrow.' 4
More recent circuit court cases involving the suppression of broadcast
indecency, based on Pacifica's narrow holding, have explicitly applied
strict scrutiny.'1 5
Like suppressing content in League of Women Voters and Pacifica,
when government enacts a broadcast law to suppress a viewpoint, the law
receives heightened scrutiny. For example, although NCCB applied
minimal scrutiny to uphold the ban on owning a newspaper and broadcast
station in the same area, 10 6 the D.C. Circuit later applied an intentionally
unspecified heightened scrutiny to a law directly aimed at two specific
cross-ownerships controlled by Rupert Murdoch, the conservative
enactment appeared
Australian media mogul. The law's operation and
07
viewpoint.1
Murdoch's
toward
motivated by animus
Finally, laws restricting commercial speech receive more scrutiny
than laws promoting democratic content. Generally, the standard applied to
commercial speech is thought to be lower than that applied to political
speech. But Red Lion and NCCB involved political speech and applied
minimal scrutiny, while commercial speech-even in broadcast
regulation-has received a higher, intermediate standard. 10 8 Applying more
100. See, e.g., id. at 383, 386 n.16, 390, 391,393, 397.
101. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
102. Id. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[The majority and concurring opinions]
rightly refrain from relying on the notion of 'spectrum scarcity' to support their result.").
Compare id.at 748-51 (not relying on scarcity) with id.at 731 n.2 (noting that the FCC's
decision had relied partly on scarcity).
103. Id. at 770 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Pacific Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9,
29 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
104. Id.at 750 ("It is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the narrowness of our
holding.").
105. See, e.g., Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 464-65 (2nd Cir. 2007);
Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
106. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 797 (1978).
107. News America Publ'g Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
108. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Brdcst. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
United States v. Edge Brdcst. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993); Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v.
Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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scrutiny to commercial speech in broadcasting than to political speech,
while apparently odd, is easily explained: the commercial speech cases
involve suppression while Red Lion and NCCB involve promotion.'9

3. Other Media Regulation: Voice Telephone and the Postal-Press
System
Despite prevailing thought among constitutional scholars, broadcast
regulation's doctrine of permitting content promotion is the rule with media
regulation, not the exception.110 Both the wireline phone system and the
print medium have both been subject to minimal scrutiny for content
promotion and heightened scrutiny for content suppression.
Phone service has long been a central means of communication, even
for news"' and political advocacy," 2 but phone carriers have long been
subject to a range of rules promoting democratic content, such as
ownership and cross-ownership limits, some as part of consent decrees.
Ownership limits include those against owning broadcast stations," 36
5
telegraph companies, 1 4 computer companies," electronic publishing,"
and owning both local and long-distance lines.1 7 These rules have at times
been justified in reference to ensuring the availability of diverse democratic
content." 8 More importantly, phone carriers have been subject to the most
109. Cf Yoo, supra note 19, at 290-92 (arguing instead that the commercial speech cases
reflect the demise of scarcity).
110. See Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 93-111; see also Ammori, The First
Amendment's Structure, supra note 50.
111. See, e.g., JOHN P. ROBINSON & MARK R. LEVY, THE MAIN SOURCE: LEARNING FROM
TELEVISION NEWS 1986 (concluding the Americans receive much of their news by word of
mouth through discussions).
112. See, e.g., American Association of University Women, How to Build a Phone Tree,
http://www.aauw.org/issue advocacy/phonetree.cfin (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
113. See Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information
Superhighway: A Bumpy Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275, 280 (1995)
(discussing the Dill-White Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed
1934)); see also KELLOGG, THORNE, & HUBER, supra note 24, at 19-20.
114. There was not quite a cross-ownership ban, but AT&T-the dominant telephone
company-committed in 1913 to divest Western Union, the dominant telegraph provider.
See KELLOGG, THORNE, & HUBER, supra note 24, at 16-17.
115. AT&T, which was a monopoly provider, agreed in a 1956 consent decree not to
engage "in any business other than the furnishing of common carrier communications
services." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 68,246 (D.N.J.
1956); see, e.g., David McGowan, Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1185, 1203-04 (2005).
116. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 183-86 (D.D.C. 1982).
117. Gerald W. Brock, Interconnection Policy and Technological Progress, 58 FED.
COMM. L.J. 445, 445-50 (2006) (discussing AT&T's 1984 consent decree and the 1996
Telecommunications Act).
118. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 183-86 (relying on Red Lion and
other media cases, imposing the restriction on electronic publishing because "AT&T's entry
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extensive access regime, that of common carriage. This requires phone
carriers to provide carriage to all individuals seeking voice access (without
"editorial" discretion), which in turn promotes diverse content at the
expense of phone companies' editorial control." 9
Government has attempted to promote democratic content in the print
media since before the writing of the Constitution. As Richard Kielbowicz,
Ed Baker, and Paul Starr have recounted, the federal government provided
enormous postal subsidies to newspapers over other print content. For
decades, postal service was the central means of disseminating newspapers
and other information, and these postal subsidies were essential to
structuring the nation's communications system. 20 The rates benefited
publications addressing public affairs, political events, or educational
matters, and some specifically promoted local or national content to foster
certain kinds of democratic discussion. These subsidies incidentally
burdened content 1not
eligible for these benefits, such as commercial and
21
personal mailings.
Specifically, government has promoted political content. Newspapers,
which received the largest subsidies, were valued (even by the Founders122)
primarily for their political "content., 123 The 1825 postal rules specified
that "newspapers" must provide "an account of political or other
occurrences,"'] 24 and in 1828, the postmaster general specified newspapers
should include "political events.' 25

into the electronic publishing market poses a substantial danger to First Amendment
values").
119. See Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
120. See RICHARD B. KIELBOWICZ, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE, AND
PUBLIC INFORMATION, 1700-1860s (1989) (discussing the history the postal-press system).
121. See id.; PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA; POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN

COMMUNICATIONS 83-152 (2004); Baker, Turner, supra note 10; see also Lewis Publ'g Co.
v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
[W]hen Congress created the second-class postage in 1879, it granted the rate only
to newspapers "published for the dissemination of information of a public
character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts or some special industry." It
also.., specifically denied the second-class rate to "regular publications designed
primarily for advertising purposes ......
Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 107-08 (quoting Post Office Act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat.
335). Another example of newspaper regulation to promote democratic content is the
application of competition and antitrust rules. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1945).
122. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 120, at 35, 121.
123. They also carried content including "information on commodity prices, history,
exploration, philosophy, and agricultural practices." See id. at 131.
124. See id. at 123 (quoting U.S. POSTAL SERV., POSTAL LAWS & REGULATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1825 37 (1825)) (noting they also had to be published at least weekly).

125. See id. at 124.
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In several major postal acts from the 1790s to the 1970s, Congress
granted free or cheap rates to newspapers. Several rates promoted national
content and speaker localism. In order to promote national content by local
speakers, the "exchange" system (codified in 1792) permitted publishers to
send one copy of its newspaper to any other publisher; this huge postal
burden ensured national content in all local papers. 126 Other carriage
promoted local news. In various laws, 127 Congress experimented with
promoting local and rural newspapers over distant papers by ensuring free
or cheap carriage within a certain number of miles, within a county, or
within a state. 28 Implicit subsidies for newspapers and magazines remain
29
today. 1
To a lesser extent, access policy promoted other speech central to an
informed public. While early acts provided pamphlets and magazines with
rates higher than newspaper rates,1 30 Congress later lowered magazine
rates,"' but only for particular speakers. 132 To support "public discussion,"
for example, an 1879 law required all publications receiving a low secondclass rate to publish "information of a public character, or be devoted to
literature, the sciences, arts, or some special industry, and have a legitimate
list of subscribers."' 3 3 In 1917, Congress charged different rates for the
advertising
and editorial portion of magazines, subsidizing the editorial
134
portion.

Access policy also promoted noncommercial and educational content.
Government has subsidized the mailings of nonprofit organizations since at
least 1874.15 At that time, it subsidized certain associations, suggesting
benefits for content, including "educational institutions, labor unions, and
benevolent, fraternal, professional, literary, historical, and scientific

126. See id. at 145 (quoting Act of Feb. 20, 1792, 1 Stat. 238) (permitting a printer to
send one paper to "each and every other printer of newspapers within the United States, free
of postage").
127. See id. at 81-82 (discussing laws in the 1840s and 1850s).
128. See id. at 3, 31-36, 59-61, 86-92, 102; see also STARR, supra note 121, at 263.
129. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 317,
n. 180 (1998) (and citations therein).
130. See K!ELBOWICZ, supra note 120, at 36, 122.
131. See STARR, supra note 121, at 261.
132. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 120, at 123 (quoting U.S. POSTAL SERV., supra note
124, at 37).
133. See STARR, supra note 121, at 261 (quoting Post Office legislation passed in 1879).
134. See KIELBOWICZ, supra note 120, at 36.
135. See Richard B. Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Reduced-Rate Postagefor Nonprofit
Organizations:A Policy History, Critique, and Proposal, 11 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 347
(1988); see also Rachelle V. Browne, New Eligibility Requirements For Nonprofit Mail,
A.L.I.-A.B.A LEGAL PROB. OF MUSEUM ADMIN., March 20, 1994, at n.1, availableat C896
ALI-ABA 13 (Westlaw).
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societies.' 36 In 1976, Congress directed rate setting to consider certain
content: "the educational, cultural, scientific, and informational value to the
recipient."1 37 Congress reaffirmed its favoritism to noncommercial
content
38
in 1993 by imposing tests which excluded commercial mailings.1
Historically, to support these rates for political, diverse, local, and
noncommercial content, government set above-cost rates for commercial
speech, as letters were primarily commercial. 139 For example, the 1792 Act
set letter rates 25 to 115 times higher than newspaper rates. 40 In addition,
based on content-not cost-government provided higher rates for
advertising circulars than for magazines.' 14 Government also burdened
entertainment; in 1843, the Post Office denied lower newspaper 1rates
to
42
fiction published in newspaper format, effectively killing the genre.
While minimal scrutiny has been applied to content promotion, strict
scrutiny has been applied to the content-based suppression of telephony,
such as indecency regulation, 143 and to newspaper actions suggesting
targeted content suppression or viewpoint discrimination.1 44
B. No Precedentfor Strict or IntermediateScrutiny of Content
Promotion
There is no precedent in Supreme Court case law for assuming that
content-based promotion, if viewpoint-neutral, deserves strict or
intermediate scrutiny.
The case that most clearly suggested heightened scrutiny for contentpromoting laws was a Supreme Court decision involving cable television,
often known as Turner I. The issue in Turner I was whether Congress
violated the freedom of speech by requiring cable carriers, such as Comcast
and Time Warner, to carry local broadcast stations, such as local NBC
affiliates.1 45 One key question was whether the law was content-based: was
Congress favoring the content of local broadcast stations' speech?
136. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 135, at 351 (noting "Congress in 1912
clarified the law by expressly permitting fraternal, professional and benevolent periodicals"
to carry advertising yet still qualify for the subsidies).
137. See id. at 373 (quoting Postal Reorganization Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94- 421, 90 Stat. 1303, 1311 (codified at 39 U.S.C. § 3622(c)(1 1) (2006))).
138. See Browne, supra note 135, at 17 (and citations therein).
139. KIELBOWICZ, supra note 120, at 34, 83.
140. See id. at 34, 60.
141. STARR, supra note 121, at 261.
142. See id.
at 137; see also KIELBOWICZ, supra note 120, at 133.
143. Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
144. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); cf Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
145. For a description of these requirements, see Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC
(Turner1), 512 U.S. 622, 631 n.2, 643 n.6 (1994).
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Congress clearly suggested that local broadcasters deserved carriage
because of their content, noting that broadcasters provided diversity of
content, local news, local public affairs, and educational programming. 46
In Turner I, the majority maintained that the provisions were contentneutral, whereas the dissent maintained that they were content-based. The
principal dissent was straightforward: "[p]references for diversity of
viewpoints, for localism, for educational programming, and for news and
public affairs all make reference to content.' ' 147 Therefore, they are contentbased and deserve strict scrutiny. Indeed, the dissent stated, this preferred
content was meant to produce an "informed electorate,' 4 8 a "concededly
praiseworthy" goal, 149 although one that the First Amendment should
thwart in that case. The majority 5 ° also admitted that Congress seemed to
value certain content-particularly what Congress itself called "local news,
public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to an
informed electorate."' 51
But all nine Justices appeared to agree that laws meant to promote
particular content, no less than laws meant to suppress content, should be
subject to strict scrutiny. 51 The majority just
defined "content" narrowly to
53
avoid holding the law to be content-based.
146. Compare id. at 648, with id. at 677, 688 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 677, 688. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 685 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
150. Justice Stevens joined the majority merely to have a disposition of the case and
would have preferred to uphold the law without a remand. Id. at 669-74 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
151. Id. at 648 (quoting Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2 106 Stat. 1460, 1460 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
521 note)). But see id. at 677, 688 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (using the quote as evidence of
impermissible content-basis). Additionally, carriage for noncommercial educational stations
derived from Congress's perception of the stations' role in providing "educational and
informational programming to the Nation's citizens" and their role in educating the public.
Id. at 648.
152. Id. at 639 (claiming cable's "physical characteristics may have [a role] in the
evaluation of particular cable regulations, they do not require the alteration of settled
principles of our First Amendment jurisprudence").
153. Id.at 643.
As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.
By contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without
reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
In fact, the Court seemed hesitant to state or deny that promotion of particular
subject-matter is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 644, 647. It suggested at one point that
content-suppression and viewpoint-promotion were problematic, in keeping with my
argument: "Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that
suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.
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So the majority's first mistake was appearing to concede that laws
promoting content could be classified as content-based and subject to strict
scrutiny. This mistake is why the video-on-demand hypothetical beginning
this Article may be problematic.
The majority's second mistake was applying the usual test for
content-neutral regulations to a law promoting content. The usual test is an
intermediate scrutiny standard often referred to as the O'Brien test, named
for the case announcing it. 154 The standard generally requires that the
government not burden "substantially more speech than necessary" to
advance the important interests.' Similarly, other judicial phrasings do15not
6
refer to any particular speakers, but merely refer to a burden on speech.
A key factor in the Court's mistake here was the interpretation of this
language to mean the cable carrier's speech, not "speech" alone. 157
Laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message are
subject to the same rigorous scrutiny." Id. at 642 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
Moreover, the Court ignored content-sensitive preferences that did not suggest
viewpoint-preferences. Compare id. at 650-51 (stating noncommercial stations had no
special content requirements), with 47 C.F.R. § 73.621(a) (noncommercial stations "will be
used primarily... for the advancement of educational programs"); Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 180, 223-24 (1997) (avoiding decision on content-sensitive
low-power provisions); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 644, n.6 (same); Turner I, 512 U.S. at 632
(exempting station content that substantially duplicates another carried station or multiple
national network affiliates).
154. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (involving draft-card
burning).
155. Turnerll,520U.S. at 185, 190.
156. Government can choose any means if its interest "would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation." See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662 (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). This formulation does not inherently privilege
certain speakers. In addition, government cannot choose a means "if there are numerous and
obvious less-burdensome alternatives," but this question too does not turn on burdens to a
particular speaker. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d
181, 199 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S.
410, 417, n.13 (1993)). Justice Breyer's Turner II phrasing of "proper fit" is unclear, but
turns on "speech-enhancing" and "speech-restricting" alternatives, without privileging
particular speakers. Turner II,
520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring).
157. The majority remanded to the lower court for "substantial evidence" of the interest
and narrow tailoring. In Turner II, the Court upheld the regime, again splitting 5-4, finding
that Congress had substantial evidence for both prongs. Justice Breyer, who had not been on
the Court when Turner I was heard, concurred in the judgment, on somewhat different
grounds. Turner11, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring) (not endorsing the provisions'
anticompetitive rationales).
Justice Breyer's fifth-vote concurrence is generally agreed to contain Turner IPs

central holdings. See, e.g.,

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, WHY THE COMMISSION SHOULD NOT ADOPT
A BROAD VIEW OF THE "PRIMARY VIDEO" CARRIAGE OBLIGATION (2002), submitted with Ex

Parte Presentation of Nat'l Cable & Telecomm.s Ass'n, Carriage of Digital TV Brdcst.
Signals, FCC CS Docket No. 98-120 (rel. July 9, 2002), resubmitted with Ex Parte
Presentation of Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Carriage of Digital TV Brdcst. Signals,
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Government could burden no more of the cable carrier's speech than
necessary; the judiciary does not scrutinize the burden on speech generally.
While perhaps government should not burden more "speech" than
necessary, 58 in media cases, government may be burdening some speech
(like a cable operator's) for the benefit of other speech (like a broadcaster's
or an independent programmer).5I 9 There is not necessarily a burden on
speech, just a burden on some speech for the benefit of other speech. While
there may be potential dangers with such regulation, the risks are not
FCC CS Docket No. 98-120 (rel. Nov. 24, 2003); see also CHARLES J. COOPER, MICHAEL W.
KIRK, & BRIAN S. KOUKOUTCHOS, A MANDATORY MULTICAST CARRIAGE REQUIREMENT
WOULD VIOLATE BOTH THE FIRST AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS (2006), submitted to the FCC
under Ex Parte Comments of the Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, CS Dkt. No. 98-120 (rel.
Sept.
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.
aspx?id=128; DONALD B. VERRILLI & IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN, A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF THE "PRIMARY VIDEO" CARRIAGE OBLIGATION: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR

TRIBE (2002), submitted to the FCC under Ex Parte Presentation of Nat'l Ass'n of Brdcst.,
Carriage of Digital TV Brdcst. Signals, FCC CS Docket No. 98-120 (rel. Aug. 5, 2002);
HELGI C. WALKER et al., PROMOTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST BENEFITS OF BROADCASTING IN
THE NEW MILLEN1UM: THE FCC CAN AND SHOULD UPDATE ITS EXISTING CARRIAGE
REGULATIONS TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE DIGITAL AGE, submitted to the FCC under Ex
Parte Presentation, Carriage of Digital TV Brdcst. Signals, CS Docket No. 98-120 (rel. June
6, 2006).
Justice Breyer also suggested, but did not state, that government could attempt to
promote content for an informed citizenry; indeed, he wrote, national communications
policy "seeks to facilitate the public discussion and informed deliberation, which . . .
democratic government presupposes and the First Amendment seeks to achieve." Turner II,
520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring). Understandably, Justice O'Connor's dissent
characterized Justice Breyer's concurrence as admitting the must-carry laws were contentbased. Id. 230-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But Justice Breyer disagreed, and in fact
endorsed the application of O'Brien, as though the must-carry provisions were accurately
characterized as content-neutral. He suggested, however, that the tailoring test should turn
on a "proper fit" between "potentially speech-enhancing and speech-restricting and speechenhancing consequences." Id. at 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Lillian R.
BeVier, The FirstAmendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89
MINN. L. REv. 1280 (2005) (critiquing this formulation).
158. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
159. See Donald Verrilli & Michelle Goodman, Turner Broadcasting and the First
Amendment, COMM. LAW., Summer 1997, at 7, 11 ("[M]ew technologies ...... involv[e]
many, often competing, speech interests, [so] the Court will move away from tiered
scrutiny."); Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage:Approaches to Analyzing the First
Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1071, 1074 (1992) ("The
traditional approach focuses on two interests: the interest of the telephone company as a
speaker and the government's interest. It fails to take into account ... [the speech interests
of] 'the telephone company's customers."'). Speakers include those providing or seeking to
provide programs, content, or Web sites, as well as viewers, listeners, and users. Certain
rules will benefit some speakers at the expense of others, benefiting some speech at the
expense of other speech. Cf. Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 974-77 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (programmers have standing to bring claim against the satellite set-aside); Turner
II, 520 U.S. at 227 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing competing speech interests). There is
no precedential or normative reason for favoring the wireline carrier's speech over other
speech. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner]), 512 U.S. 622, 647 (1994).
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addressed
by requiring narrow tailoring versus the wireline carrier's
60
speech.1

Over the last decade, Turner I and its mistakes have had a profound
impact on the regulation of major media. 16 1 It is considered the default
media test and most media regulations are generally concerned with
content. 62 Ownership limits and access rules aim not only to decentralize
the media system but also to promote democratic content-to promote
more diverse sources, on the assumption (endorsed by the Supreme Court)
that diverse sources provide viewpoint-diverse content. 163 Some observers,
including Justices, suggest ownership limits and access rules are contentbased for this reason.' 64 Numerous access laws also favor65 particular kinds
of content, such as educational, local, or political content.
Turner I's dicta had no basis in precedent. Turner I cited the usual
definition of a content-based law, which turns on whether or not the law
suppresses, burdens, or restricts speech based on its content. 66 In Turner I,
160. Cases with speech interests on both sides resemble many non-speech cases
involving balancing of competing, equally compelling, interests. See Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928); STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 39-56 (2005).

161. Historically, the debate over the constitutionality of ownership and access rules has
been framed in terms other than content-analysis, as the debate even predates contentanalysis. The Supreme Court did not announce content-analysis until its 1972 decision in
Police Dep't of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); see also McDonald,
supra note 10, at 1359-60, 1364. This was years after Red Lion and Jerome Barron's classic
article. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New FirstAmendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641 (1967). The analysis did not become the dominant paradigm until the late
1980s to early 1990s. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988). Content-neutral tests are often traced to United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), as well as to a 1975 article by John Hart Ely about flag
desecration. John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
andBalancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975).
162. Media rules are also concerned with economic competition, but regulating
economic competition is generally subject to minimal scrutiny, and is somewhat tangential
to the reason why media regulation receives First Amendment scrutiny.
163. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978) (stating
"[Tihe Commission has long acted on the theory that diversification of mass media
ownership serves the public interest by promoting diversity of program and service
viewpoints...").
164. See, e.g., Turner I, 512 U.S. at 678 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court is
mistaken in concluding that the interest in diversity .. .is content neutral.") (citations
omitted); see also Sinclair Brdcst. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(Sentelle, J., concurring and dissenting in part) ("[T]here may be merit to petitioner's
argument that the 'diversity' rationale is essentially content-based . .
165. See supra Part III.A.2. & III.A.3.
166. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002) (noting the
challenged clause "prohibits speech on the basis of its content"); City of L.A. v. Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) ("Generally, the government has no power to restrict
speech based on content ....); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,
817 (2000) ("When the Government seeks to restrict speech based on its content, the usual
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the majority and dissent could cite, at most, nine cases even suggesting the
proposition that content-based promotion deserves exacting scrutiny.167 But
eight of them are generally irrelevant to this issue because they involved
viewpoint-based laws and not merely content-based laws. 68 The ninth case,
presumption of constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is reversed."); McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (characterizing the law at issue as
"indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its content"); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992) (describing government's limited power to "to proscribe.
.. speech on the basis of a content element"); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing "the Court's recent First Amendment precedents
suggesting that a State may restrict speech based on its content in the pursuit of a
compelling interest"); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) ("[T]he government's ability to impose content-based
burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas
or viewpoints from the marketplace."); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 46-47 (1986) ("This Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of
restraining speech on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.");
see also supra note 152 and accompanying text.
167. See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 641-43; id. at 677-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at n.88 (providing a different discussion of nine of these
cases, reaching a similar conclusion).
168. In two cases, the cited language is dicta, as the cases did not involve subject-matter
promotion. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792-93 (1989) (upholding law as
content-neutral); R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391 (noting that the law engaged in "actual viewpoint
discrimination"). Moreover, that dicta referred to the problem of promoting "message,"
which seems to refer to viewpoint, not content or subject matter. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at
642 (quoting Ward,491 US at 791) (referring to speech regulation based on "[agreement or]
disagreement with the message it conveys"); see also id. (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 386
(referring to "hostility--or favoritism---towards the underlying message expressed"). In
another two cases, the laws were structured in ways suggesting not content-promotion but
targeted content- or viewpoint-suppression. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 676-78 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing Ark. Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)).
Turner I notes that "both [taxes schemes] were structured in a manner that raised suspicions
that their objective was, in fact, the suppression [not promotion] of certain ideas." Id. at 660;
see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (noting Arkansas Writers' Project
singled out "a disfavored group," not a favored group, "on the basis of speech content").
The dissent in Turner I also cited Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991), which
upheld the challenged law that seemed to promote newspaper content, while not promoting
cable content, which supports my argument that government can promote news content.
Another three cited cases pertained to exemptions to general anti-picketing statutes
for labor disputes. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-68 (1980); but see id. at 473-74
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disputing the majority's factual characterization); Police Dept. of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965)
(Black, J., concurring). The Justices deciding these cases naturally regarded these laws as
promoting a viewpoint or message-picketers tend to take one viewpoint (labor's) of a
dispute, not the other (shareholders'). Cox, 379 U.S. at 580 (Black, J., concurring) ("[If the
streets of a town are open to some views, they must be open to all [views]."); see also
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (noting distinction for labor's "message").
An eighth case could suggest that promotion of subject-matter alone is problematic,
but the primary concern seemed to be viewpoint-discrimination, as the government was
targeting a news magazine. In Regan v. Time, 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984), the federal
government brought criminal charges against Time Magazine under a criminal
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Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,169 arguably struck down a
viewpoint-neutral law promoting subject matter, but is an "exception" that
proves the rule. The law at issue did not promote educational, diverse,
political, or even ideological speech. The law forbid displaying specific
signs in specific areas, but had more exemptions for commercial speech
than for ideological speech. The Court found that promoting advertising at
the expense of noncommercial speech "inverts" the Court's usual
preference for "ideological" speech, suggesting perhaps a government
intent or effect of suppressing ideological speech.1 70 This case suggests
only that promoting content other than democratic content at the expense
of democratic content may be problematic.
As with the lack of precedent for strict scrutiny, there is no precedent
for applying intermediate scrutiny to content promotion.

C.

Wireline Regulation: An UnjustifiedAberration

Despite the dicta in Turner I, to the extent that wireline regulation is
actually an aberration from prevailing doctrine, this departure is wholly
unjustified. One cannot distinguish wireline regulation, the aberration, from
the normal areas of broadcast, telephony, limited public fora, subsidies,
copyright, and speech exceptions. 17 1 The most accepted means of
distinguishing these areas would turn on the distinction between
government and private property. One could argue that wireline regulation
involves private property, but that the other areas discussed involve either
government-owned property (as with broadcast regulation, limited public
counterfeiting statute for a cover photo depicting dollar bills. Eight Justices held that an
exemption to that law, for "news-worthy" publications in these circumstances, was
impermissibly content-based. But the holding should not be misread; other exceptions for
newsworthy content are constitutional, including copyright's fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107
(2006). The problem was that the government was attempting to read the exception for
"newsworthy" as an open-ended standard to judge that a news magazine's cover one month
is not "newsworthy." The concern may have even been more salient in Regan, as the statute
provided criminal penalties. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997).
169. 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality).
170. Id. at513-15 &n.18.
171. Scholars have attacked the notion that speech should not receive a different
constitutional standard based on the media, and often argue that media's disparate treatment
should be reconciled. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and
Liberty Beyond the Electronic Frontier, Keynote Address at the First Conference On
Computers, Freedom & Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991) (transcript available at
http://www.epic.org/free-speech/tribe.html) (proposing amendment making freedom of
speech "fully applicable without regard to the technological method or medium"); see also
THE MEDIA INSTITUTE, RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE ELECTRONIC
MEDIA (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997). A famous exception embraces the differing
standards for addressing differing First Amendment concerns. See Lee C. Bollinger, Jr.,
Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of the
Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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fora, or subsidized speech) or the act of government shaping property rights
(as with fair use in copyright and speech exceptions). The First
Amendment plays a different role when government property is
involved.1 2 But this property argument is not persuasive, so adopting an
exception based on it for wireline regulation would lack basis.
First, private property is not sufficient to distinguish wireline
regulation because property is not the relevant doctrinal issue, descriptively
or normatively. Descriptively, under existing law, the magnitude of the
property burden alone does not trigger a constitutional speech violation.
Consider several examples. Common carriage and interconnection rules
severely burden telephone companies' ability to use their physical property
for speech, yet common carriage is generally considered far less
constitutionally problematic than the far more minimal "property" burden
in a newspaper right-of-reply rule. 7 3
Outside of media, government can often burden property owners to
favor the speech of others, such as by requiring shopping mall owners to
permit speech on their owned premises. 74 Like common carriage and 75a
shopping mall statute, general laws such as those concerning antitrust,
labor, 17 6 and child labor 177 may burden media companies' property just as
much or more than media- or speech-specific laws. Yet such rules are
generally not subject to heightened scrutiny merely
because they burden
1
speech property, 178 even for newspaper companies. 79
Indeed, since any property can improve a speaker's ability to reach
audiences, almost every law regulating any property should be subject to a
First Amendment challenge if regulating speech property resulted in

172. See, e.g., Ammori, Curriculum, supra note 27, at 70-72 (and sources cited therein);
Richard A. Epstein, Property,Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 41
(1992).
173. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 684 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating "it stands to reason that
if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it can ask
the same of cable companies...").
174. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
175. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
176. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
177. GEORGE SELDES, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 304 (1935) (noting that the Los Angeles
Times called child labor "what long experience has demonstrated to be, without exception,
the greatest training school for city-bred boys in existence"); id. at 303 (noting that Franklin
D. Roosevelt stated "freedom of expression.., will be scrupulously respected-but it is not
freedom to work children...").
178. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 640-41; Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the
UnchartedZones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1294-97 (2005).
179. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
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heightened scrutiny. 180 One could try to limit scrutiny only to mediaspecific laws regulating property, but this limitation would seem
appropriate only to ensure that government is not suppressing afree press.
The limitation is unrelated to property.
Conversely, property is not the key concern when government
property is involved. For example, government cannot engage in contentbased regulation in traditional public fora like government-owned parks.'i '
So, to accept this objection, one would have to turn positive First
Amendment law on its head.
Normatively, private property should not be a key free speech concern
for several reasons. Without reference to free speech theory, it is unclear
whose property rights would be supreme for First Amendment purposes. In
addition to wireline carriers, viewers also have property rights-in their
radios, TVs, telephones, and computers.
Moreover, to argue that property matters for broadcast, subsidy, or
other regulation, one would need a larger theory of the First Amendment
underlying that assumption. For example, one would not assume that
government can violate the Equal Protection Clause in broadcast
regulation-such as by allocating licenses (or providing a subsidy or
setting aside a forum) only to white people-merely because it "owns" the
airwaves; nor could government engage in cruel and unusual punishment
against broadcasters in spite of the Eighth Amendment. To distinguish
broadcasting (or public fora or subsidies) because government "owns" the
airwaves or other property rests on a larger-but unarticulated and
undefended-conception of what the First Amendment means. 182
Second, even if property were or should be relevant, it would not
distinguish wireline regulation. Like limited public fora, subsidized speech,
and broadcast regulation, one could characterize wireline regulation as also
involving government property. Wireline companies receive massive
benefits from governments, including (historically) exclusive franchises,
compulsory copyright licenses, and access to rights-of-way. 183 Indeed,
government always confers massive benefits on individuals and entities,
180. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUMBIA L. REv. 873 (1987);
see also Ammori, Curriculum, supra note 27, at 80, n.145 (sources cited therein), Thomas
H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the
FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
181. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 10, at 1363-65.
182. See, e.g., Fee, supra note 10, at 1155 (making this point about the government-asspeaker doctrine). For an article on property and speech, see John 0. McGinnis, The Once
and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 49
(1996); see also Epstein, Politics of Distrust,supra note, 172.
183. See Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Comm. Policy Act, Report
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 5101 (2007);
Hawthorne & Price, Rewriting the FirstAmendment, supra note 51, at 516.
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such as property law itself, as well as contract law, corporate law, and
limited liability.' 84 But these benefits are neither necessary nor sufficient to
permit speech regulation in any area.
Similarly, content-promoting access rules and ownership limits shape
property rights, just as do copyright law or speech exceptions. Wireline
companies do not necessarily have, in their bundle of property rights, the
right to exclude all access seekers or the right to buy more and more lines
free of ownership limits. 85 Moreover, government usually can shape
property law to promote substantive values, such as providing exceptions
for easements and adverse possession to ensure economic development and
efficiency. With copyright and other property, government promotes
valued speech, an interest even more powerful than mere efficiency. So
government similarly should be able to shape wireline property, like other
86
property, to promote efficiency or an informed and robust democracy.1
There is no reason to assume that property distinguishes wireline
regulation from all the other areas of First Amendment doctrine where
content promotion is permitted. There is a conflict between wireline
regulation and these other areas, and, based on normative values, that
conflict should be resolved by aligning wireline regulation with the other
areas of speech doctrine: content-based promotion of democratic content
deserves minimal scrutiny.
IV. NORMATIVE ARGUMENT: LAWS PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC
CONTENT SHOULD RECEIVE MINIMAL SCRUTINY FOR MERE
VIEWPOINT-NEUTRALITY
Government attempts to promote democratic content should be
subject to a viewpoint-neutral test, not Turner's content analysis. The most
widely accepted values underlying the First Amendment support this
conclusion, and potential objections do not undermine it.
A. PromotingDemocratic Content Furthersthe FirstAmendment's
Underlying Purposes
To determine the applicable standard of scrutiny in any doctrinal area,
one must usually refer to an underlying theory of free speech because the

184. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 44.
185. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Access and Exclusion Rights in Electronic Media:
Complex Rules for a Complex World, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 459 (2006).
186. Because of certain speech-based concerns, however, including audience confusion
or dignitary harm to the speaker, regulation of certain property, like private homes, may
necessarily be more problematic than regulating other property, such as shopping malls or
cable lines. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 96-100 (1980)
(Powell, J., concurring).
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bare phrase "freedom of speech" (or "of the press") 187 does not indicate
which speech should be protected (for example, fraud versus political
88
leaflets) or what kind of regulation would undermine that freedom.'
Rather, "freedom of speech" generally is defined in relation to underlying
theories justifying that freedom.
The leading theories involve participatory democracy or individual
autonomy, 89 though scholars can define democracy or autonomy
differently.' 90 As these rationales are usually defined in the literature, both
support content promotion. Indeed, courts and scholars often explain how
content promotion furthers democracy or autonomy when courts ensure
democratic content by striking down laws restricting it-rather than when
Congress or the FCC legislate to promote such content. 91 Moreover, the
argument against promoting democratic content based on democracy or an
autonomy theory is generally less common than arguments based on
practical considerations, so only a brief theoretical discussion is necessary.
The democracy rationales for free speech focus on speech's role in
ensuring self-government, fostering an informed citizenry, permitting
collective decision making, and safeguarding democratic decision-making
processes that enable political change. 92 Its defenders include Alexander
Meiklejohn, 93 Cass Sunstein, 194 Robert Bork,' 9 Owen Fiss, 196 and C.
187. For an argument that the Press Clause should have a distinct interpretation from the
Speech Clause, see C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause
UnderExisting Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007) (and sources cited therein).
188. See Schauer, supra note 54.
189. See, e.g., TRIE, supra note 10, at 785-89. Other, but less widely accepted theories
include promoting tolerance, LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); promoting
good character, Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character,46 UCLA L. REV. 1567
(1999); checking government (which can be classed with the democracy theories), Vincent
Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, Am. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 521 (1977);
providing nonviolent safety valves for dissent, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely
supposed grievances and proposed remedies"); and promoting truth, Weinberg, supra note
48, at 1113-64 (critiquing this marketplace of ideas theory).
190. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317
(1998) (discussing several conceptions of democracy); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and
Amish Children:Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001) (discussing
conceptions of autonomy).
191. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Kagan,
supranote 10.
192. See, e.g., POST, supra note 14, at 268-89 (critiquing some theories of free speech
and democracy).
193. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-

GOVERNMENT (1948); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
194. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 44.

195. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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Edwin Baker
(when corporate or press speech, not individual speech, is
197
involved).

Supreme Court cases, especially those involving media regulation,
often emphasize democracy rationales: speech that is "'indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth,"' according to League of Women
Voters, is the form "which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most
anxious to protect"; 198 a core First Amendment goal, according to Red Lion,
is "producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs."' 199
Educational, political, and viewpoint-diverse content can naturally
promote democracy. If citizens have more access to viewpoint-diverse
local and national political information, as well as educational content, they
can make better decisions regarding political options and better hold
elected officials to account for incompetence or corruption.2 00 Courts and
scholars have long accepted the common sense assumptions that diverse
viewpoints support robust political debate; 20 that political speech supports
democratic decision making; 20 2 that local political speech fosters better
decision making about local political matters; 20 3 and that educational
speech supports citizen education. 204 They also have rejected the notion that
all content deserves equal treatment. The First Amendment, in some areas,
specifically favors democratic content-for example, by providing special

196. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY
USES OF STATE POWER (1996); OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996).
197. See, e.g., EDWIN C. BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994); Baker,
Media Citizens Need, supra note 190. Ed Baker limits this democratic analysis to the Press
Clause, applying autonomy analysis for the Speech Clause. See Baker, Press Clause, supra
note 187.
198. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383 (1984) (quoting
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
199. Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969).
200. See infra notes 201-204 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 571 n.16 (1990); FCC v. Nat'l
Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 797 (1978)) ("'[I]t is unrealistic to expect true
diversity from a commonly owned station-newspaper combination"'); Prometheus Radio
Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2003); Benkler, Autonomy, supra note 190. For an
argument against promoting viewpoint diversity through "government action," see Yoo,
Architectural Censorship,supra note 45.
202. See, e.g., League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 381-82.
203. See, e.g., 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, paras. 73-79 (discussing the FCC's historical
concern with localism).
204. See, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 648 (1994)
(noting Congress's conclusion that "educational and informational programming" has a role
in educating the "Nation's citizens").
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protection to speech on "matters of public concern" for libelous speech and
the speech of public employees. °5
While perhaps one does not need a highly sophisticated theory of
democracy to make this argument,20 6 we can use make use of four classes
of democracy theories, as categorized by C. Edwin Baker. 20 7 The first
group of theories, "elite democracy," assumes that expert technocrats
should make political decisions. 20 8 Even those elites, however, use wireline
media. They would probably make considerable use of the electoral speech
in the video-on-demand hypothetical, and they would likely get their news
online, due partly to network neutrality. 20 9 The three other groups of
theories assume government must rest on broader participation, not elite
competence, but differ on how individuals and groups should or do
participate-by promoting individual interests, aggregating interests to
seek a "common" good, or by doing both.210 Under any of these theories,
however, society benefits from increased and more diverse discussion
about political affairs-to recognize individual and group interests, to
mobilize with others with similar interests, to understand the interests and
views held in common of others, and to formulate policy for common
social interests.21' Individuals would benefit from more diverse political
content under any of the assumptions of how they should interact with one
another, though some groups could benefit more or less based on actual
flows of information. In short, the democratic rationales support contentbased promotion of democratic content.
Beyond democracy rationales, autonomy also supports the
constitutionality of promoting democratic content. As Thomas Emerson,
Yochai Benkler, and C. Edwin Baker (regarding individual speech) have
most fully argued, freedom of speech ensures that individuals can exercise
and develop their autonomy.21 2 Autonomy is a somewhat "nebulous
205. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
206. See POST, supra note 14, at 273 (claiming several theories would lead to similar
conclusions regarding the benefits of public discourse).
207. See C. EDwIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY (2002); Netanel, supra
note 45; Magarian, supra note 47.
208. BAKER, MARKETS, supra note 207, at 129-34.
209. E.g., Project for Excellence in Journalism, State of the News Media 2006:
Audience,
http://www.stateofihemedia.com/2006/narrativeonlineaudience.asp?cat=3&
media=4 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009) ("College graduates are clearly the group over all with
the most regular online news consumption.").
210. BAKER, MARKETS, supra note 207, at 135-37.
211. Id. at 135-53.
212. C. EDwIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); For Emerson's
argument, see First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(citing THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7
(1966)) (discussing "what some have considered to be the principal function of the First
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concept" referring to individuals' freedom-either their freedom to express
themselves (or act) however they wish, to develop their faculties and
humanity as they choose, and to align their actions213
with their preferences,
and in turn, their preferences with their inner "self."
Access and ownership rules promote access to such content, so the
rules further the autonomy interests of the millions of listeners, viewers,
and users of media. As perhaps the leading autonomy theorist C. Edwin
Baker has argued, individuals bear legitimate claims to autonomy, while
artificial entities structured by law-including media corporations-should
not be seen as bearers of autonomy.214 Government structures the media
environment and media corporations, adopting corporate and media law to
promote social goals. Because government must balance competing social
goals in shaping entities, government can shape the entities to further
collective goals-including democracy and individual autonomy-without
respect for the contingent, non-pre-existing "autonomy" of the entity it is in
the process of shaping. 1 5 Individuals, including listeners, viewers, and
users, can best exercise their autonomy when they have access to a range of
divergent views about how they should lead their lives.2 16 Indeed, under
existing law, government can regulate the autonomy of corporations in
many ways-including securities disclosures-and has long "regulated"
media companies' speech in ways that it could not regulate individuals'
speech.217
Even if one wrongly ascribes autonomy to corporations and media
entities, 218 one cannot conclude that ownership or access rules are
necessarily problematic. Courts would still have to balance the autonomy
interests of corporations as speakers against those of the millions of
Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and
self-fulfillment"); for Benkler's argument, see Benkler, Autonomy, supra note 190.
213. See, e.g., Benkler, Autonomy, supra note 190, at 26, 32, 34-35. Some scholars, such
as Robert Post, link the democracy and autonomy rationales because of the individual
autonomy's importance to self-government. See, e.g., POST, supra note 14, at 268-89;
TRIBE, supra note 10, at 787. Others argue that the democracy and autonomy rationales
often support the same outcome in particular cases, including media regulation cases. See,
e.g., Baker, Press Clause, supra note 187 (discussing areas where the theories would lead to
different results); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12 ("The individual's interest in self-expression
... [and] the concern for open and informed discussion . ..often converge."). C. Edwin
Baker further argues that individual rights are grounded in autonomy and press rights in
democracy. See Baker, Press Clause, supra note 187.
214. See Baker, Turner,supra note 10, at 62-82.
215. See id.; Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the FirstAmendment: Towards a
Core Common Infrastructure (Brennan Ctr. for Justice, White Paper for the First
Amendment Program Mar. 2001), availableat http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf
216. See Benkler, Autonomy, supra note, 190.
217. See supra Part III.A.
218. See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 47 (cataloguing and critiquing the authors making
this assumption).
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individuals as listeners. But there is no persuasive reason in speech theory
for favoring the interests of those very few (profit-seeking, governmentstructured, and artificial) speakers over the First Amendment interests of
individuals. 21 9 There are two common, unpersuasive arguments. The first
rests on property rights, which can be rejected for reasons similar to those
discussed above: that property is not the relevant normative principle and if
it were, it would be nonetheless indeterminate. 220 The second rests on
extreme distrust of government, which can be rejected for reasons
explained in the next section.
B. The PoliticalBranches Should Have a Role in Promoting
Democratic Content
Most people tend to agree that democratic content furthers the First
Amendment's underlying goals, but those who object to government
promoting democratic content tend to do so based on notions about the
proper role of government in society and practical considerations about
government incentives. 221 They argue that government should have no role
in valuing content,2 22 that valuing content would improperly skew the
speech market,223 and that even content promotion likely reflects the
censorial incentives of government.224 These objections are misplaced.22 5
First, government does and should have a role in "valuing" particular
content. Its role is not necessarily to remain neutral. Government often
values speech "content" by suppressing some content with minimal judicial
219. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (noting the First
Amendmen4 "necessarily protects the right to receive" speech) (internal quotations omitted);
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (upholding rights of citizens to receive
mail where the First Amendment did not apply to speakers, who were abroad); Red Lion
Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1960) (holding that the speech rights of viewers and
listeners are "paramount" over the broadcast speakers). Even if one looks within the entities
to their employees' autonomy, these can often conflict, as among editors, publishers, and
owners. It is unclear whose autonomy courts should protect.
220. See supra Part II.C.
221. Many have critiqued content analysis in general, for example as descriptively
inaccurate, see for example, Baker, Turner,supra note 10; Fee, supra note 10; cf Schauer,
supra note 54; as impractical because of the difficulty in determining whether a law is
content-based, see Redish, supra note 10; and as providing too little protection for speech
incidentally burdened by content-neutral laws, see for example, Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313-14 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Alexander,
supra note 10.
222. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (U.S. 1991); Alexander, supra note 10, at 932-45.
223. Stone, Content Regulation, supra note 10, at 198; but see Baker, Turner, supra note
10, at 84-88 (critiquing this argument).
224. But see Fee, supra note 10, at 1152-56 (critiquing this position).
225. See Ammori, Curriculum, supra note 27, at 70-72 (discussing government distrust
theories).
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scrutiny, such as suppressing sexual harassment, fraud, criminal
conspiracy, deceptive advertising, defamation made with actual malice, or
collusive agreements. 22226 Government also values content when it funds
public schools, libraries, advertising campaigns, or subsidized or
government speech. This includes providing the public with agency records
under the Freedom of Information Act or publishing laws and
regulations.22 7 More broadly, the Constitution need not require government
neutrality; in many ways, the Constitution is substantive, as illustrated by
favoring democracy over monarchy and freedom over slavery.228
Moreover, with content promotion, government likely furthers citizens'
roles in valuing speech central to the First Amendment by increasing the
amount and diversity of democratic content for the citizens-not the
government-to face, grapple with, and value.
Second, despite any "anti-skewing" arguments, government should
distort or skew the speech environment toward more democratic content.
As detailed in the previous paragraph, government already skews content
with laws ranging from outlawing conspiracy to funding public education.
One would need a theory for why skewing in wireline media regulation is
more problematic than skewing in conspiracy and public education, and
that theory cannot simply be an "anti-skewing" principle. In addition, a rule
against "skewing" is incoherent because there is no pre-governmental, nonskewed, speech market. 229 Existing entitlements affect speech, such as
entitlements for property, contract, copyright, and innumerable
communications-specific laws. So remaining "neutral" in any particular
case privileges these existing entitlements. 230 Government should be able to
"skew" this already-skewed market to promote more diverse, political,
educational, or local content because the existing market baselines231 may
not account for democratic content's positive externalities,232 and may lead
to less democratic content than socially optimal or desirable.233
226. See Schauer, supra note 54.
227. See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v.
Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2007).
228. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065-67 (1980).
229. See Baker, Turner,supra note 10, at 84-85.
230. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 2-7 (1993) (critiquing
what he terms "status quo neutrality," which favors the status quo by being ostensibly
neutral); Robert L. Hale, Coercion andDistribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. Sci. Q. 470 (1923).
231. For the classic constitutional argument on the economics of media content see
BAKER, MARKETS, supra note 207.
232. Farber, supra note 14, at 566-67.
233. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods,
Network Effects, and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 789 (2000); R. Randall Rainey,
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Third, despite extreme government distrust, content-promoting laws
do not necessarily reflect a censorial purpose. Attempts to promote
democratic content are less likely to reflect impermissible purposes-such
as incumbency-protection, intolerance, or paternalism-than those
suppressing content. Like content-neutral laws, content-promoting laws do
not single out disfavored content, and thus are a clumsy means to targeting
any disfavored content. Like a time, place, or manner restriction, the mustcarry regime in Turner would be ineffective at targeting disfavoredcontent;
the same is true of the video-on-demand hypothetical,23 a4 librarian's decision
to buy certain books, or most media ownership limits.
Fourth, scholars suggest that the political branches simply cannot be
trusted in any, even "benign," speech regulation.235 But an adequate
consideration of comparative institutional competencies and incentives
demonstrates that extreme government distrust is misguided for contentbased promotion of democratic speech. The history of public television,
public schools, limited public fora, and subsidized speech suggests that
democratic content promotion is not invariably or usually a cover for
censorship.
Beyond ignoring the history of these areas, this government distrust
argument rests on faulty assumptions about the relative institutional
incentives and competencies of government concerning content promotion.
The ambiguous phrase "freedom of speech" is defined not only with
reference to underlying theories but also to institutional competencies and
incentives (as this objection of "never trust government [except the
judiciary]" suggests). Institutional choice is central to the First
Amendment, the defining feature of which is the constitutionalizing of free
speech and thereby entrusting to the judiciary the policing of other

S.J., The Public's Interest in Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and
Fairnessin Broadcasting:A Critical Review of the Public Interest Duties of the Electronic
Media, 82 GEO. L. J. 269 (1993).
234. It does not matter if democratic promotion protects some incumbents for the same
reason why it does not matter if additional information benefits most competent agents. See,
e.g., Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First
Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233 (1997). To the extent that
additional information reduces those agency costs and permits the public to support agents,
even incumbent agents, who are competent and responsive to public interests, the First
Amendment generally favors, not disfavors, that result. Cf Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory
Disclosureas a Solution to Agency Problems,62 U. Cm. L. REv. 1047 (1995).
235. As Redish and Kaludis noted,
[S]cholarly equanimity in the face of government's insertion of its regulatory
power into the marketplace of private expression is grossly inconsistent with the
venerable tradition of healthy skepticism of the governmental regulation of
expression. It is also inconsistent with much of the actual history of such
regulation, which has more than justified such skepticism.
Redish & Kaludis, supra note 47, at 1086-87 (internal citations omitted).
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governmental institutions. While one could contest the usual assumptions
made about society's regulatory institutions,236 even under those
assumptions it is acceptable to permit the political branches to promote
viewpoint-neutral democratic content. The political branches are
institutionally imperfect, but all regulatory institutions are imperfect,
including norms, markets, legislatures, agencies, and courts.237 One must
compare the institutions' relative imperfections to determine how best to
promote freedom of speech and its underlying values, as this objection
attempts, but fails, to do.
In First Amendment thinking, in distrusting government relative to
the judiciary, scholars apparently assume relative incentives and
competencies based on unrealistic assumptions about a "textbook" free
speech problem.238 In this problem, soapbox speakers and pamphleteers
exchange views in an American location akin to Hyde Park's Speaker's
Comer, a public park location where speakers of all stripes debate and
lecture. The government then arrests and charges a dissenter because it
disagrees with the dissenter's views. Norms and the market seem to be
working fine; everyone at the park could stand on inexpensive soapboxes
and chat with anyone else. But the political branches seem dysfunctional.
Government officials have incentives to silence dissenting speech. The
officials' relative competencies, such as fact-finding and balancing of
competing social goals, are unnecessary since the facts and goals are
simple and straightforward. Government officials have speech-restrictive
incentives, and the lone dissenter cannot effectively convince government
because he has no army of lobbyists, no budget for campaign contributions,
and (because he is silenced and in jail) no ability to organize other citizens
to help. Meanwhile, the judge (one assumes, not a jury23 9) is seen as
236. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 190 (1987) (noting one could
argue that "arguments made about one institution can be made reasonably well for the
other"). Shifting assumptions, of course, one could argue that the judiciary has speechrestrictive incentives as well.
237. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago
School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998); Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Review and the
Protectionof ConstitutionalRights, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 275 (2002).
238. See Ammori, Curriculum, supra note 27, at 92-121 (discussing scholars' focus on
street comer speech over mediated speech); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination,
Distribution, and Free Speech, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (1995) (claiming recent
"leading First Amendment litigants" include a Ku Klux Klan member, the American Nazi
party's head, and a young cross-burning skinhead).
239. Juries are often assumed to reflect local prejudice against the dissenter. See, e.g.,
Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 527 (1970)

("[Tihe jury cannot be expected to be sufficiently sensitive to the first amendment interests
involved in any given proceeding."); cf Marvin Ammori, Public Opinion and Freedom of
Speech 14 (John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, White Paper, July 14, 2006), available
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insulated from politics, brave, wise, and heroic. The judge should not defer
to government.
In wireline regulation, it is not so clear that the political branches are
untrustworthy and the judge is a hero. Unlike in a Speaker's Comer, private
speech regulation of wireline industries, such as norms and markets, may
not ensure the robust debate and diverse content of a Speaker's Comer.240
Actual experience suggests that "private regulation" has led to little
political or educational programming and considerable fluff and violence
on wireline television. 241 Norms often do little to ensure robust media
debate and can even enforce silence.242 Markets are also imperfect. Unlike
a Speaker's Comer, economic failures pervade media markets. Advertising,
public good qualities, externalities, and concentrated ownership may
reduce outlets' responsiveness to public demands and weaken their roles as
watchdogs, 43 In addition, the wireline industries subject to Turner (local
cable and phone markets) are extremely concentrated--often monopolies
z
24
or duopolies 244-and thus deviate from the classical market model.
Imposing constitutional barriers to ownership and access rules, as the
Turner standard does, enshrines the markets' imperfections because
ownership limits and access rules could increase the competition in these
markets.246 So, with Turner's scrutiny, there would be even less reason to
trust the outcomes of wireline markets.

at http://research.yale.edu/isp/papers/ISP-PublicOpinion-fos.pdf (disputing the assumption
that the public is speech-restrictive).
240. See Lessig, supra note 237, at 664 (discussing the role of norms and markets).
241. See, e.g., CONSUMER VOICE FOR COMMUNICATION CHOICE, YOUR GUIDE TO
CHANNELS "A LA CARTE," Feb. 24, 2006, http://www.hearusnow.org/other/6/10/28/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2009).
242. See Ammori, Public Opinion andFreedom ofSpeech, supra note 239, at 18, 22.
243. BAKER, MARKETS, supra note 207; United Church of Christ Comments, supra note
21; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Nobel
Prize Lecture, (Dec. 8, 2001) (transcript available at http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/
economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf).
244. See Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, CoordinationandLock-In: Competition with
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (M.
Armstrong & R. Porter eds., 2007) available at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/
FarrellklempererWP.pdf; TURNER, supra note 2, at 2-5 (detailing lack of competition in
broadband market).
245. See, e.g., TURNER, supra note 2, at 28 (noting predictable underprovision in the
broadband market based on the concentrated market of phone and cable carriers for
broadband provision).
246. It could also encourage the U.S. government to follow the model of other nations'
governments and own media, such as municipal wireline and wireless projects, which the
government, under Turner, can more easily regulate. So this result would be the opposite of
that sought by those demanding government "stay out" of the media sector.
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Unlike in a Speaker's Comer, government action in wireline media is
not clearly or always likely censorial.247 For highly technical laws, unlike,
say, park regulation, legislators have considerable institutional competence
to gather and weigh evidence,248 as do executive agencies.249 While their

247. This concern is sometimes framed as the judiciary needing to "err" on the side of
"speech" by striking down all content-promoting laws out of concern for censorial motives.
See, e.g., Fee, supra note 10, at 1164-68; Kagan, supra note 10, at 415 ("if a court could
determine governmental purpose directly, these rules, principles, and categories might all be
unnecessary"); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, supra note 10, at 79 ("[T]he Court
should err on the side of free speech. It should allocate the risk of uncertainty to the
government, not to speakers."). But, in addition to other problems, the soapbox example
overlooks the social costs of wrongly striking down a potentially good law. If government is
acting to promote political or diverse content, the price of striking down the law is higher
than when government acts to suppress political or diverse content.
248. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 664-68 (1994); Turner
Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (assuming legislators' better factfinding capability). With media regulation alone, the Senate has a committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation with jurisdiction over telecommunications and media issues.
That committee consists of twenty-two senators. Each senator on the committee has a
legislative advisor, usually an experienced lawyer, specializing partly in
telecommunications issues. The committee itself has several telecommunications counsel,
each with considerable industry expertise, focused exclusively on the issue. The House of
Representatives has a committee, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, with
fifty-seven members, and a Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet with
thirty-three members. The subcommittee and its members also have staff who specialize in
telecommunications issues. Beyond their committee and personal staff, congresspersons
have access to reports and other information from the FCC, the expert agency regulating
wireless and wireline communications, and can request information by legislation or by
sending letters to the FCC Commissioners. See, e.g., Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability, Notice of Inquiry, 19 F.C.C.R. 5136 (2004). ("Congress
instructed this Commission to conduct regular inquiries."); Letter from Senator Barbara
Boxer to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin (Sept. 18, 2006), reprinted in Press Release, Boxer
Concerned About Report Suppression at FCC (Sept. 18, 2006), available at
http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfin?id=263223. Congresspersons' offices also
have access to the Congressional Research Service, which is akin to an in-house think tank
providing research reports on legislative issues.
249. The primary communications regulator, the FCC, has considerable expertise and is
somewhat insulated from any particular elected official but still responsive to the political
branches and industry. It is generally responsive to Congress and the majority of
Commissioners, being from the President's party, often follow the administration's agenda.
The FCC is also believed to be "captured" by regulated parties, who later claim in courts
that their speech has been abridged, either because of limitations in agency officials'
incentives or competencies. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwith Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchlineto Ronald Coase's "Big
Joke": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 335, 405 (2001) ("A
recent FCC Chairman conceded that his agency had long been known as, 'Firmly Captured
by Corporations."') (quoting Reed E. Hundt, The Progressive Way, Speech at the Ctr. for
Nat'l Policy (May 6, 1996)); see also Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 52-64
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (discussing the FCC's improper secretive contacts with certain regulated
parties).
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incentives are not flawless,2 5 ° some officials may have incentives to
promote the availability of political, educational, and diverse content, as the
officials may believe their electoral chances would benefit from increased
political discussion.2 51 If the official has been remarkably competent, she
may want the public discussing politics. If she has been incompetent, she
might still want the public discussing politics, as the public may assumein the absence of information-that the official is even more incompetent
than she was in actuality (or not just incompetent but also corrupt). 252 If
other members of her party are more unpopular than she is, an incumbent
may want the public to have enough political information to realize the
differences between the party and the incumbent. 3 Or government may
legitimately be correcting market failures, as it does in other areas. Or
officials could feel electoral pressures "to foster appearances of
'openness.' ' 254 In addition, the checks and balances of competing
government institutions may foster intra-government pressures to promote
political content and openness. 255 So, for content promotion, legislatures
and agencies have far better fact-gathering capacity,2 56 and their incentives
257
are somewhat ambiguous, and sometimes positive.
250. See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 47 (discussing pathologies such as campaign
financing). Also, elections may not hold officials to account, as members of the House often
run in gerrymandered districts where reelection is almost automatic and senators are up for
election only once every six years.
251. Many theorists have explained why some incumbents would benefit from less
speech. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw
112 (1980). House races usually receive little coverage and the districts are gerrymandered,
so name recognition and incumbency can go a long way to ensuring reelection. See Richard
S. Dunham et al., Does Your Vote Matter?, Bus. WK., June 14, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_24/b3887068.htm.
252. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 14.
253. See, e.g., Press Release, Phil Singer, Democratic Victories Are A Bad Sign For
Lincoln Chafee (Nov. 9, 2005) (arguing that moderate Rhode Island Senator Lincoln
Chafee, up for reelection, "walks hand-in-hand" with the more conservative elements of the
Republican party, particularly George W. Bush).
254. Weisberg v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 830 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(discussing agencies' conflicting pressures of openness and nondisclosure). See, e.g.,
Obama Faces Questions On His Blind Trust, MSNBC.cOM, Mar. 8, 2007, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17515394/; Michael Isikoff, What's in Howard Dean's
at
8,
2003,
available
Dec.
Files?,
NEWSWEEK,
Vermont
Secret
http://www.newsweek.com/id/60800.
255. For example, the legislature passed the Freedom of Information Act, which requires
federal agencies to make certain agency records and other information public. See, e.g.,
Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
256. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 664-68 (1994).
257. Most judges, but not the federal Article III judges handling most First Amendment
claims arising from the Communications Act, must run for election and reelection, so their
incentives may be somewhat different. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian
Difficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 689 (1995). There is,
however, considerable evidence that judges' decisions correlate with public opinion over
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At the same time, unlike the imaginary soapbox dissenter, the judge is
not the last and sole resort. Carriers have other institutional alternatives
abundantly available to them, such as the political branches themselves.
Wireline carriers can defend their interests before Congress, the FCC, and
in the marketplace. Cable and phone carriers have an army of lobbyists and
lawyers, give millions in contributions, and negotiate the laws that affect
them.2 58 Indeed, many of their most powerful lawyers served at the highest
levels of government.259 Moreover, unlike the textbook street corner
dissenter, who confers an externality through dissent, carriers can
internalize much of the benefits of their speech through profit, especially
for entertainment and advertising, 260 and have considerable economic
incentive to "speak" and to lobby government.26' Unlike street corner
dissenters, cable and phone carriers can fight officials with wide positive
and negative coverage.262 At the same time, the benefits to others are
diffuse while the harms of regulation to media companies are large and
focused, favoring their political ability to organize and lobby against more
diffuse public interests.263 So there is no reason to assume that judges are
necessary to protect speech and an unfettered market, or that government
can never be trusted with content promotion. In fact, judges may feel the
need to put a finger on the scale of regulation in order to promote
democratic content, rather than applying heightened scrutiny.
Finally, considering institutional incentives and competencies, the
judiciary need not generally require certain ownership and access rules
without any supporting congressional statute or FCC rule. 26 Even if the

time, even on speech issues. See Ammori, Public Opinion and Freedom of Speech, supra
note 239, at Appendix 1.
258. See, e.g., Kate Ackley, AT&T Takes Shape as Lobbying Giant, ROLL CALL, Feb. 20,
2007, available at http://www.saveaccess.org/node/775; Ted Hearn, Cable, Phone, Net
Companies Have Spent $110 Million This Year To Influence Telecom Reform. Was It Worth
It?, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Oct. 23, 2006, available at http://www.multichannel.com/

article/CA6383576.html.
259. Digital Destiny Blog, http://www.democraticmedia.org/jcblog/?p=222 (Mar. 27,
2007, 08:56).
260. See, e.g., BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS, supra note 197, at 7-42,
62-70 (discussing advertisers' desire for a buying mood and the resulting preference for
entertainment programming).
261. See CASS R. SuNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
262. See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, A Shadow Government: Private Regulation, Free
Speech, and Lessons from the Sinclair Blogstorm, 12 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 1,
6-7 (2005); PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2005
ANNUAL REPORT: LOCAL TV/OwNERSHP (2005), http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/
2005/printable localtvownership.asp.
263. See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 237, at 54-97; George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT SCI. 3 (1971).
264. See Magarian, supra note 47.
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Supreme Court would require such rules,265 the Court could instead
recognize citizens' vital role in shaping communication possibilities. Media
policies present questions at the heart of our democracy and there is no
reason to insulate these issues from public debate and reserve the issues to
judges, so long as the public can contribute.2 66 The public should debate
and determine whether the media system should be more or less
commercial, more or less concentrated, more or less universally available,
or provide more or less democratic content.267
In addition, citizens' media reform groups, such as Free Press and
others, are not defenseless in the legislative arena. 22668 Citizens' groups can
draw on a solid majority of the public that opposes conglomerations of
media power269 and politicians could agree with the groups, or have
incentives to respond to them, if the groups organize large numbers of
otherwise inactive supporters.270 Media policy questions have become
subject to the participation of millions of Americans on the right and left. 27 1
Notably, the groups have even had some success, including in media
265. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 174-81 (1973) (Brennan,
J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
266. My faith in citizen groups' ability before government, however, assumes the public
can mobilize to respond to media issues and that they have spaces, like the Internet, to
discuss these issues. See, e.g., Ammori, A Shadow Government, supra note 262; see also
Ben Scott, The Politics andPolicy of Media Ownership, 53 AM. U.L. REV. 645 (2004). It is
partly for this reason that government must permit some autonomous space to individualswhether or not government acts on the basis of content. See infra Part IV.E.
267. See, e.g., ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993)
(chronicling the debate over broadcast policy); see also Scott, supra note 266 (discussing
the political battle over the FCC's broadcast ownership rules).
268. See, e.g., Amy Schatz, Nonprofit Takes On Big Media, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2007, at
A8, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117322652114528926.html (discussing
media advocacy group Free Press, which has two dozen full-time employees, whose entire
annual budget for 2006 was roughly $2.5 million).
269. See CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MEDIA DIVERSITY

AND DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A REVIEW OF RECENT SURVEY EVIDENCE (2002),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/MediaSurveyl 0.31.02.pdf.
270. See KOMESAR, supra note 237, at 70 n.32 (referring to small groups that could act
as catalysts and whose interests overlap with the general public's interest).
271. The 2002 review of broadcast ownership rules inspired several million Americans
to file comments with the FCC opposing further broadcast concentration. See, e.g., Scott,
supra note 266. In 2006, over a million citizens signed petitions supporting network
neutrality rules, and congresspersons and candidates had to respond to public pressure and
proclaim their public support of network neutrality. Press Release, Craig Aaron, Free Press,
Outpouring of Support for Net Neutrality Sweeps the Country, (Aug. 31 2006), at
http://www.savethelntemet.com/=pressl3 (describing a 25-city campaign over several days
that prompted four senators to announce their support for network neutrality). If the
judiciary were the forum for such debate, the incentives and methods of citizens to
participate in the debate would be different, as the judiciary would likely be less responsive
to citizen participation. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 251.
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ownership and network neutrality, both with Congress and in the FCC case
against Comcast.272 Media issues have, surprisingly to some, started to
become major political issues on which even presidential candidates must
take a stand. a73
Courts need not assume the political branches are stifling wireline
carriers' speech as though those carriers are defenseless soapbox speakers.
Nor should courts be an additional hurdle to pro-democratic regulation.
Media companies may have inordinate influence before governments and
regulators, 274 as they do before the courts, 275 and citizens' groups fighting
these companies face huge barriers.276 But when citizens do succeed in
promoting democratic content through the concentrated media system, the
courts should not stand in the way and apply heightened scrutiny.
At the same time, district and appellate courts lack competence to
shape these laws. Judges should not be invited to select among a wide
range of possible rules which include defining the possible contours of
network neutrality, 277 video-on-demand regulation, local public access
channels, and wireless regulation such as spectrum allocation, which in
turn includes auction mechanisms, merit hearings, lotteries, geographical
and frequency slices, license challenges, etc. Congress and a specialized
agency, the FCC, can handle these issues with some deferential judicial
oversight.
So, in sum, there are no clear institutional reasons-based on the role
of government, valuing, skewing, or extreme government distrust-for
requiring heightened scrutiny of viewpoint-neutral content promotion.
Democratic content serves the First Amendment's core values and there is
no good reason to believe government cannot have a role in promoting
such content.

272. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 266 at 645; K.C. Jones, AT&T Merger Contains First
Net Neutrality Guidelines, TECH WEB NEWS, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.freepress.net/
news/20078; Svensson, supra note 7.
273. See Babington, supra note 26.
274. See, e.g., Magarian, supra note 47; see also J.H. SNIDER, SPEAK SOFrLY AND CARRY
A BIG STICK: How LOCAL TV BROADCASTERS EXERT POLITICAL POWER (2005).
275. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Comes Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974).
276. See Heam, supra note 258 (nothing the phone and cable carriers spent up to $100
million on lobbying for the 2006 Communications Act, and against network neutrality).
277. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Workshop to Examine Broadband
Connectivity Competition Issues, Including Network Neutrality (Jan. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/0 l/broadbandwrkshp.htm.
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C. CaseLaw Involving Newspapers Actually Supports This
Framework
Critics often object that media, including wireline media, should be
treated not like the many broadcasting media, telephony, limited public
fora, subsidies, copyright, and exceptions. Rather they should be treated
"like newspapers," which are often wrongly believed to be immune from
government regulation.278 This immunity is usually celebrated.279
But the usual assumptions about newspapers' immunity from
regulation are not true.28° Courts do not automatically invalidate laws just
because they impose some burden on newspapers. 281 And Turner did not
suggest that the classic newspaper regulation case, Miami Herald
PublishingCo. v. Tornillo,282 stands for the proposition that newspapers are
somehow immune from regulation-just that the law in Miami Herald
resulted in less speech and threatened viewpoint discrimination.2 83 in
addition, as discussed above, the government used postal subsidies to
actively shape the newspaper industry.
Moreover, a viewpoint-neutral test for wireline media helps
newspapers. While newspapers' conduit was the heavily-manipulated mail
system, it is now increasingly wires and airwaves-as newspapers are
being distributed via the Internet.284 So, for example, network neutrality
protects existing and new newspapers from being potentially blocked or
degraded.2 85 The legal scholars who argue by analogy to Tornillo for the
speech rights of wireline conduits do so at the expense of twenty-first
century protection for newspapers.
Indeed, a viewpoint-neutral test is acceptable for print. Contentsuppressing laws are problematic. Those objecting to the right-of-reply
laws generally object not because of content promotion, but because of the
278. See Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 58-62 (arguing that there is a different
newspapers standard).
279. See, e.g., Ammori, Curriculum, supranote 27.
280. See Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 105-11.
281. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
282. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
283. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 653-57 (1994); see also
Baker, Turner, supra note 10, at 111-14.
284. Julia Angwin & Joseph T. Hallinan, Newspaper Circulation Continues Decline,
Forcing Tough Decisions, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2005, at Al (noting decreased print
circulation); NEWSPAPER ASS'N OF AM., THE SOURCE: NEWSPAPERS BY THE NUMBERS (2006),

available at http://www.sangabe.biz/adcenter/mediakit/the_source-newspapersbythe_
numbers.pdf (noting online newspaper readership has increased by 15.8% in 2005, and
online advertising revenues at public newspaper companies grew 30%-60% in 2005).
285. Interestingly, newspapers commonly owned with cable systems have supported
network neutrality. See Digital Destiny Blog, http://www.democraticmedia.org/
jcblog/?p=52 (June 13th, 2006, 08:36).
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threat of viewpoint discrimination in enforcement. Moreover, some rules
may be constitutional when applied to cable carriers or broadcasters, but
not newspapers, because of the bigger threat of viewpoint discrimination.
Newspapers, unlike most cable channels, are primarily devoted to
providing local content on political affairs and historically take editorial
positions, while broadcasters and cable operators do not. So, a law
affecting newspapers would evidence more viewpoint concerns, regardless
of the "technology" used to deliver the paper's content. z86 For many laws, it
could be possible to have processes that meet the viewpoint concern.287
This fact does not evidence a need for differing First Amendment standards
or to forbid government from promoting democratic content through major
wireline media.288
V. HARD CASES
A. DecentralizedCommunications Systems Should Be Favored
Whatever Content They Produce
One could also object that decentralized communications systems, not
democratic content, should be the favored goal. Whether or not it promotes
diverse content, decentralization ensures that many speakers can contribute
to debate, that diverse forms of social associations are possible, that a
handful of speakers do not have the power to control public discourse, and
that government cannot manipulate and control communications by
capturing (or being captured by) a small group of speakers. 289 Indeed,
courts have often reaffirmed the value of the nation's communications
286. See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656 (distinguishing newspapers and cable carriers based
on bottleneck considerations).
287. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 239.
288. Indeed, in Turner I, the Court suggested that technological differences matter in
analyzing particular laws but that different standards should be unnecessary. Turner 1, 512
U.S. at 639 ("This is not to say that the unique physical characteristics of cable transmission
should be ignored when determining the constitutionality of regulations affecting cable
speech. They should not."). So has the D.C. Circuit. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 58
F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("While we apply strict scrutiny ... regardless of
the medium affected ... our assessment ... must necessarily take into account the unique
context of the broadcast medium.").
289. See BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS, supra note 45, at 261-65; Review of the
Commission's Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Report & Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 12903, para. 15 (1999) ("the greater the diversity of ownership in a particular area,
the less chance there is that a single person or group can have 'an inordinate effect, in a
political, editorial, or similar programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level"')
(quoting Commn's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and TV Brdcst.
Stations, Report and Order, 45 F.C.C. 1476, para. 3 (1964)); City of L.A. v. Preferred
Comm., Inc., 13 F.3d 1327, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[tjhe risk that a single operator will
be captured by city hall (or in turn will capture regulators) is far greater than where two or
more operators face off against each other" than if there is only one speaker).
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system fostering the "widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources....
The greatest defense of a decentralized communications structure has
been made by Yochai Benkler, who is widely acknowledged as the "best
communications theorist of our generation." 29' Even if Benkler is right
about the benefits of a decentralized environment (and I agree with
Benkler),292 the content analysis that I have proposed would hopefully
support the goal of decentralization. First, it would eliminate Turner's
problematic scrutiny that invalidates routine ownership and access limitsboth of which favor decentralization. Second, under the test proposed in
this Article, government would have incentives to favor procedural
structures diminishing the threat of viewpoint discrimination. One
procedure would be to adopt speaker-based, not content-focused, rules that
promote diverse speakers. These speaker-based laws would increase
content diversity, such as with ownership limits and well-defined access
rules; content-focused rules would wrongly assign market power to a few
owners and then regulate this content for "balance," which threatens
viewpoint-discrimination. 293 As a result, the viewpoint-neutrality test
should encourage decentralization by favoring speaker diversity.
Third, under current government assumptions, one need not choose
either content promotion or diverse sources. Courts, Congress, and the FCC
have generally agreed that diverse sources lead to diverse content. 294 If
government changes its mind and decides, for example, that a small
number of speakers would produce more diverse speech than a large
number of speakers295 (in opposition to 200 years of communications
policy296), the courts may have to scrutinize this conclusion very carefully
based upon the underlying values of the First Amendment. As it is, the

290. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
291. LESSIG, supra note 3, at 23.
292. See e.g., Ammori, The First Amendment's Structure, supra note 50.
293. See, e.g., FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775, 801-02 (1978).
294. See, e.g., 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 13620, para. 313 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review ProposedRulemaking]; Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. at
797 (quoting Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 111 (1975)) ("it is
unrealistic to expect true diversity from commonly owned station-newspaper combination").
295. Indeed, some economic models, with contested assumptions, predict this result. See,
e.g., 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 294, at paras. 31315 (discussing but rejecting the theory put forth most famously by Peter 0. Steiner in
Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition in Radio
Broadcasting, 66 Q. J. ECON. 194 (1952)).
296. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); KIELBowIcz,
supra note 120; Ammori, The First Amendment's Structure, supra note 50.
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content-promoting test proposed here should generally
decentralized speech power, even if that is the ultimate goal.

B.

support

The Individual Speech "Exception"

Although courts should generally permit viewpoint-neutral content
promotion, there will be difficult questions. One of these concerns whether
a law actually discriminates on viewpoint,2 97 but the courts already have to
address this distinction. Another concerns whether a law promotes speech
or suppresses speech, but this distinction is already implicit in doctrine.29 8
Courts often distinguish between content-based promotion and contentbased suppression. With content-based suppression, government singles out
and burdens a particular class of content that it disfavors. With contentbased promotion, government singles out andpromotes a particular class of
content, such as educational speech, even to the incidental burden of other,
nonfavored content. 299 Contrast the video-on-demand hypothetical with a
law suppressing cable content about elections. While the distinction
between promotion and suppression may blur at the edges, 300 in most cases
courts should be able to discern the difference. Promotion is no more
difficult to define than other terms commonly used in First Amendment

297. For example, by email, Daniel Farber proposed a law fostering "diversity" of
viewpoints on the issue of evolution. Because certain viewpoints, involving evolution, are
dominant, such a law would likely be a subterfuge to promote creationist viewpoints. This
law differs from the laws I endorse in the text, which promote diversity of viewpoints in a
wider subject area, such as politics, not a specific controversial subject. But this case is not
very difficult. Courts can determine that laws requiring diversity on a particular, narrow,
subject matter, where one view is clearly dominant, are viewpoint-based. C.f Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
298. See supra Part II.
299. In a philosophical sense, some content-comparison would necessarily occur even
with content-promotion-promoting content "Xx" technically suppresses content "not-Xx."
But favoring Xx does not suggest an intent to suppress any particularcontent. For example,
if a government grants a subsidy to one artist out of thousands of applicants, the grant
suggests favoritism to that artist's content. But it does not suggest hostility to any or all of
the other applicants' content. Or contrast a library stocking its shelves with one book, out of
the millions of options, which does not suggest hostility to particular content, with removing
a controversial book from its shelves, which does. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982); Pratt v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 1982).
300. For example, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993), to
decrease litter and clutter, a city revoked permits authorizing news racks of commercial
circulars. The Court found no reasonable fit between decreasing litter and eliminating such
news racks while permitting newspaper news racks. It remains unclear to me why a city
cannot view newspapers as more valuable and worthy of cluttering sidewalks than
advertising circulars, but whether courts should view the law as "promoting" of newspapers
or "suppressing" commercial speech depends on the history and facts. Compare this with
Valentine v. Chrestenson,316 U.S. 52 (1942). Thanks to Daniel Farber for this point.
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analysis.3 ° 1 Courts always deal with difficult cases and can handle these
with no more or less difficulty than other such cases.30 2
Beyond these difficult cases, there should also be, at most, a limited
exception where content promotion would be problematic-for individual
compelled speech, only in certain spaces. Because First Amendment
scholars often focus disproportionate attention on individual speech, they
wrongly assume this limited exception is the rule. But even this
"exception" is relevant for very few laws. Most laws that scholars propose
as problematic for individual speech would be unconstitutional under the
model proposed here; these laws involve viewpoint discrimination (such as
forced pledges of allegiance) 30 3 or content suppression (such as disclosures
that would disproportionately burden unpopular speech).3 °4
In some circumstances, however, the judiciary should invalidate
content-promoting laws that conflict with this notion-each individual
should have the minimal autonomous space necessary in a democracy to
develop considered judgments, alone or in conversation with others. That

301. Scholars often claim First Amendment terms are ambiguous. Consider the
following: for a discussion of "speech," see Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment
Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1995); for a discussion of "commercial speech," see
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 180; Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of
Commercial Speech, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990); for a discussion of "content," see Redish,
supra note 10; and for a discussion of "viewpoint," see Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heins, supra note 55. But such terms are necessary,
of course, to effect the First Amendment's purpose.
302. See supra note 301, sources cited therein, and accompanying text.
303. The most famous compelled speech cases involved iteration of a state-sanctioned
political viewpoint. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating a law
requiring drivers to have a license plate with a particular state-approved messages--"Live
Free or Die"); W. Va. State Brd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating law
requiring schoolchildren to pledge allegiance to the flag).
304. The Court has addressed laws requiring charities, political parties, and individuals
to disclose information, such as the names of members or speakers, "promoting" that
speech. In most of these contexts, the Court has found that disclosure of names will burden
political speech rather than promote it. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc.,
525 U.S. 182, 199-200 (1999); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). This right turns on whether the law will significantly burden
speech, rather than being a general right against compelled speech or against promoting
content. For example, the Court has upheld requiring individuals to disclose their
contributions to major political parties. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(upholding campaign disclosure requirements), with Brown v. Socialist Workers '74
Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982) (invalidating these same compelled disclosure laws
as applied to unpopular parties because disclosure would expose individuals to stigma and
deter them from contributing). Similarly, in some cases, government promotes content only
when other content has been uttered, using a viewpoint-based trigger. See Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (1986) (invalidating a requirement
that a utility company include certain messages in its billing envelopes, appearing to
promote certain viewpoints and discourage others); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974); but cf Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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is, there should be some space where one can be free to speak or not speak
whether or not the government acts with reference to content.
To begin, this right is not absolute. Often, with little harm to
democracy or the autonomy necessary in a democracy, 30 5 government
requires citizens to "speak" or "promote content" in many ways, including
requiring disclosure of campaign contributions, relevant information at
trial,30 6 income (for tax purposes), 30 7 and ex parte meetings with
agencies. 308 Rather, tthe judiciary should ensure that individuals have some
access to minimal space to form their thoughts and communicate with one
another.3 °9
It is hard to quantify how much access to such space individuals
constitutionally need, but the necessary space could mirror the areas where
the Court has struck down even content-neutral laws. Even when contentneutral, government cannot ban individuals from communicating through
lawn signs or through door-to-door soliciting; 310 cannot entirely close
public fora, such as streets and parks, which are traditionally open to
speech of all content by all persons;311 and cannot ban 31even
obscene
2
speech, which lacks constitutional protection, in one's home.
This sort of limited autonomous space, exempt from even contentneutral burdens, should be free of content-promoting laws for similar
reasons. 313 Imagine a rule that requires each family to discuss politics at
home for an hour per day. Within one's house, one should be free to utter
or not utter whatever one chooses. 314 Institutional concerns also support this
notion, as government promotion would likely be pernicious and permit
305. For a more skeptical discussion of the harm of compelled speech, see Larry
Alexander, CompelledSpeech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147, 150 (2006).
306. See David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment "Right to Remain Silent"?: The
Supreme Court's CompelledSpeech Doctrine,40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368, 369 (1993).

307. Id.
308. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200-1.1204 (FCC exparterules).
309. See, Fee, supra note 10.
310. See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994); Hague v. Comm. for Indus.

Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
311. Such spaces can be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. See
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
312. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
313. See Fee, supra note 10, at I 110-13 (collecting cases). A strong case could likely be
made that the Internet should be included in this minimal space. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 870 (1997) ("any person with a phone line [and neutrality guarantees] can become
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox"); see also
Yemini, supra note 8.
314. Another problem with requiring such utterances in people's homes is that, to
enforce the law, government would have to invade people's reasonable expectation of
privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
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government almost total power and surveillance into private spaces. 315 So
these individual speech cases do not suggest that content promotion is
problematic.316 Nor should they. They represent a limited exception
necessary in a democracy for respecting individual autonomy. By contrast,
the mistaken and increasingly important exception for wireline regulation
serves a harmful role in our democracy, lacks basis, and should be
abandoned.
VI. CONCLUSION: REPLACING CONTENT NEUTRALITY
The prevailing assumptions about content-based laws are wrong.
Laws promoting democratic content pose different risks from contentbased laws meant to suppress disfavored content, and the constitutional test
applied to content-promoting laws should focus on the main risk: viewpoint
discrimination. Wireline ownership and access rules are currently the
exception to the general rule-not the best reflection of doctrine. A
viewpoint-neutral test, as usually applied in First Amendment analysis,
would better serve that Amendment's purposes and support the national
debate about how best to structure our society's democratic discourse.

315. See Fee, supra note 10.
316. In other areas, "compelled speech" would be a problem, but again not because
"neutrality" is required. For example, compelling subsidization of political messages by
compelled members would permit government to establish powerful (semi-private)
institutions, even with forced membership, that has political power disproportionate to its
private support. Compare Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)
(unconstitutional to force union members in agency shop to contribute fees for political
actions), with Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (unconstitutional to force
lawyers required to join the California bar to contribute fees to support the bar's political
actions); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)
(constitutional to require students to subsidize student activities, even if the students
disagree with some of the activities). See also Jason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77
WASH. L. REv. 639, 655 (2002). These cases reflect a concern that organizations cannot
leverage state-compelled membership into political power. In turn, government cannot
establish groups through compelled membership and then enable the groups
disproportionately to affect political affairs unrelated to whether or not their members
actually agree with the group's message. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494
U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 258 (1986)) ("[T]he political advantage of corporations is unfair because 'the
resources in the treasury of a business corporation are not an indication of popular support
for the corporation's political ideas."'). In addition, there is also a line of expressive
association cases, including Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), and
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Compelled association involves
different problems from compelled speech, which are not addressed here.

